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THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT:
IN SEARCH OF A FEDERAL FORUM TO VINDICATE
THE RIGHTS OF INDIAN TRIBES AND CHILDREN
AGAINST THE VAGARIES OF STATE COURTS
B. J. JONES*
The Indian Child Welfare Act ! (ICWA) was enacted by Congress in
1978 to curtail the massive removal (primarily by state agencies and
courts) of Indian2 children from their homes. 3 ICWA was also an
attempt to assure that those children, who must be removed, be placed in
homes that reflect their unique cultures and traditions. 4 ICWA strives to
accomplish these goals by placing certain procedural requirements on
parties in state courts, and on the courts themselves, before the removal
of Indian children or the termination of parental rights. 5 ICWA also
imposes substantive requirements on parties, usually state courts and
social service agencies, who seek to place children in foster or adoptive
* J.D., University of Virginia, 1984; Director, Northern Plains Tribal Judicial Institute, University
of North Dakota School of Law; Chief Judge, Turtle Mountain Tribal Court of Appeals. The author
would like to thank the people of the Rosebud and Standing Rock reservations for the life experiences
necessary to write this article.
I. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-608, 92 Star. 3069 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§
1901-1963 (1983)).
2. The term "Indian," as used in this article, refers to a person who is a member of a federally
recognized tribe, or eligible for membership in a federally recognized tribe and the biological child of
a member of a federally recognized Indian tribe. This is also the definition of an "Indian child" under
ICWA. See 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (1994). "Indian" is used because in legal parlance the term has been
historically utilized to refer to the natives who inhabited the North American continent for centuries
prior to the arrival of Europeans, not because it is the proper ethnic description for Native Americans.
3. In certain states with large Native American populations, an incredible 25% to 35% of native
children were removed from their families and placed in foster care or adoptive homes sometime
during their life. See H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, at 9 (1978), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7531.
These removal rates were up to 19 times greater than the removal rate for non-Indian children in
certain states. See id.
4. In addition to the severe removal rate of Indian children from their families, it concerned
Congress that 85% of Indian children were placed in non-Indian foster homes. In Minnesota, for
example, 90% of Indian children in adoptive placements were placed in non-Indian homes. Id. at 9.
5. See 25 U.S.C. § 1911 (1994) (restricting state court jurisdiction over Indian children domiciled
on Indian reservations, requiring state courts to transfer jurisdiction over child custody proceedings
involving non-reservation domiciled Indian children to tribal courts, and allowing Indian parents and
tribes to intervene in state court proceedings); 25 U.S.C. § 1912 (1994) (governing involuntary
placements by state courts and requiring Indian tribes to receive notice of proceedings, requiring
parents to be appointed counsel, and establishing the burden of proof and requisite evidentiary
showings before a foster care placement or termination of parental rights can be accomplished in state
court); 25 U.S.C. § 1913 (1994) (governing the requirements for a voluntary placement of an Indian
child in foster care or a voluntary termination of parental rights).
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care. 6 The intent of ICWA is to restrain the authority of state agencies
and courts to remove and place Indian children because of a
well-documented historical abuse of that authority. 7
The Indian Child Welfare Act presupposes that state agencies and
courts, when confronted with a federal statute proscribing certain actions
and dictating others, will heed the federal mandate and an uniform
interstate application of the statute will be realized. The United States
Supreme Court, in issuing its only decision directly addressing the
Indian Child Welfare Act, stated that achieving a consistent application of
the law nation wide was clearly the intent of Congress when it enacted the
Indian Child Welfare Act. 8
This objective has proven to be illusory and the goal of uniformity
a farce. Many state courts have created exceptions to the application of
ICWA and have interpreted the statute in such a manner as to render
many of its provisions superfluous. 9 Compounding this betrayal of con-
gressional intent has been the failure of the majority of federal courts,
when given the opportunity to redress continued violations of ICWA by
state courts, to take corrective measures. Many federal courts refuse to
act based on the reasoning that decisions by state courts are res judicata
in federal court.10 Other federal courts have abstained from exercising
jurisdiction over federal challenges to state court ICWA proceedings on
the postulate that Congress did not intend federal court interference with
state court actions in the ICWA arena.11 Such a view forever precludes
federal court review of state court decisions, with the limited exception of
6. See Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 36 (1989). The substantive
requirements of the ICWA, according to the United States Supreme Court, are the placement
provisions of the Act. See id. (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1915 (1994)). These provisions dictate where Indian
children should be placed in foster and adoptive homes, absent good cause to the contrary, with a
strong emphasis on placing children in homes that "reflect the unique values of Indian culture." See
id.; see also 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (1994).
7. This is an important point to understand as it somewhat forms an underlying axiom of the argu-
ments laid out herein. Congress specifically found that "the States, exercising their recognized juris-
diction over Indian child custody proceedings through administrative and judicial bodies, have often
failed to recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian people and the cultural and social standards
prevailing in Indian communities and families." 25 U.S.C. § 1901(5) (1994). ICWA was therefore
remedial legislation, focusing on the inherent weaknesses of state courts to adjudicate child custody
proceedings involving Indian children. See, e.g., Native Village of Venetie I.R.A. Council v. Alaska,
944 F.2d 548, 553 (9th Cir. 1991).
8. See Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 47. The court rejected the argument that the definition of domicile
under § 1911(a) of ICWA should be determined based upon state law, primarily because it would
subject the application of ICWA to the variances in state law, in contravention of Congress's intent.
See id. at 43-7.
9. See infra notes 14-16, for example, the discussion herein regarding the creation of the "exist-
ing Indian family exception," a judicially created exception to the application of ICWA stating that the
federal law should not apply to an Indian child in certain circumstances. This exception has been
adopted by courts in at least eight states and rejected by courts in at least ten others. This divergence injudicial decision making concerns a fundamental issue under ICWA: who exactly is an Indian child.
10. See, e.g., Comanche Indian Tribe v. Hovis, 53 F.3d 298, 304 (10th Cir. 1995); Kiowa Tribe v.
Lewis, 777 F.2d 587, 592 (10th Cir. 1985).
11. See, e.g., Morrow v. Winslow, 94 F.3d 1386, 1398 (10th Cir. 1996).
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United States Supreme Court review. 12 This diffidence on the part of the
federal courts has created an "anomaly in federalism"-a federal civil
rights statute which is largely unenforceable in a federal forum and
whose very application and effect varies from state to state. 13
This article will examine the stark disparities among state court
decisions in two areas of the law involving ICWA and will suggest that in
these two areas there is a compelling need for federal court supervision
of state court decisions to both promote uniformity and effectuate the
design of the Act. The first area of law is the continued expansion of the
"existing Indian family" exception, whereby state courts ,unilaterally
decide who is a real Indian child and which Indian children need the pro-
tections of the federal law in blatant contravention of the clear definition
of "Indian child" contained in ICWA. 14 This ever expanding exception
threatens to nullify the Act in certain states because it vests state courts
with a decision they are institutionally incapable of making. 15
12. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994) (requiring federal courts to grant the same preclusive effect to a
state court judgment as the issuing state court would); see also Barbara Ann Atwood, State Court Judg-
ments in Federal Litigation: Mapping the Contours of Full Faith and Credit, 58 IND. L.J. 59 (1982).
13. ICWA is not usually included in a discussion of the major federal civil rights acts. Cf 18
U.S.C. §§ 241, 242 (1994) (placing criminal prohibitions on conspiracies to violate civil rights by
private parties and those acting under color of state law); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982 (1994) (originally
part of the 1866 Civil Rights Act designed to eliminate the last vestiges of slavery in the South); 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) (allowing suits in federal court against any person who violates federal consti-
tutional or statutory rights under the color of state law); 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1994) (providing a civil
remedy for private conspiracies to violate the civil rights of a person). The parallels between these
statutes and ICWA are striking. The major federal civil rights statutes are designed to provide a
remedy for state violations of federally-mandated protections. Viewed in this light, ICWA is a para-
digm of a federal civil rights statute because it is designed to insulate the integrity of Indian tribes and
families, a federal obligation under treaties and the trust responsibility of the federal government,
against the documented abuses of state authority. See, e.g., White v. Califano, 437 F. Supp. 543, 555
(D.S.D. 1977), (recognizing the trust responsibility of the United States to provide mental health
services for Indians).
14. Congress intended ICWA to apply to a "child custody proceeding" involving an "Indian
child." Child custody proceeding is defined under the statute as: a foster care placement, termination
of parental rights proceeding, a pre-adoptive placement, or an adoptive placement. See 25 U.S.C. §
1903(1) (1994). "Indian child" is defined under the statute as "any unmarried person who is under
age eighteen and is either: (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an
Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe." Id. Some state courts have
modified the definition of an Indian child, in apparent contradiction to the clear language of the
statute, to hold that ICWA does not apply to an Indian child who has never lived with an Indian family
member or who has only lived with an Indian family member with few ties to an Indian tribe. Such
decisions are a purported attempt to effectuate the intent of the statute to prevent the breakup of
Indian families.
15. One of the underpinnings of ICWA is the congressional finding that state courts, because of
their ignorance of traditional Indian child rearing practices, were incapable of passing judgment on
the fitness of Indian families to raise their children. See H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, at 12 (1978),
reprinted in, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7534-35; see also Symposium on Racial Bias in the Judicial
System, Minnesota Supreme Court Task Force on Racial Bias in the Judicial System, 16 HAMLINE L.
REV. 624, 625 (1993) (examining how cultural ignorance contributes to the bias against Indian
families). The existing Indian family exception allows state courts to make the very value judgments
pertaining to which Indians have sufficient contacts with their cultural and traditional antecedents that
Congress felt the state courts were incapable of making.
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The other realm of apparent state court deviation from the goals of
Congress in enacting ICWA is the use of a "best interest of the child"
standard in denying transfers of child custody proceedings involving
Indian children from state to tribal courts. 16 Courts that have adopted
the best interests standard are thus able to question the ability of tribal
courts and social service agencies to effectively provide for the best
interest of Indian children, turning the congressional presumption in
favor of tribal court decision-making on its head.17 These two areas of
ICWA jurisprudence have been selected primarily because they point out
the extremes certain state courts reach in attempting to defeat the federal
goals behind ICWA and they highlight the divergence in state judicial
decision making across the nation.
This article will also examine the attempts by litigants, primarily
Indian parents and tribes, to invoke federal court jurisdiction to invali-
date some of the decisions which scorn the existence of ICWA. 18 Almost
without exception, these attempts have proven fruitless because of a
reluctance on the part of federal courts to intervene in pending state
court actions 19 and the existence of the federal full faith and credit
statute restricting federal court review of previously litigated state court
decisions. 20 Federal courts following these lines of decisions ignore the
fact that state courts, because of cultural ignorance (though not
necessarily malice) toward Indian families and tribes, played
16. Under, 25 U.S.C. § 191 1(b) (1994), a state court shall transfer a child custody proceeding
involving an Indian child to a tribal court upon a petition by the Tribe, parent or Indian custodian,
absent objection by either parent, declination by the tribal court or a showing of good cause to deny a
transfer. The United States Supreme Court referred to this transfer provision as the Tribe's "pre-
sumptive jurisdiction," thus implying that transfer should be the rule, not the exception. Mississippi
Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 36 (1989). "Good cause" is not defined under the
statute, but the Bureau of Indian Affairs has promulgated "guidelines" for state courts to follow in
implementing this section. See Guidelines for State Courts: Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed.
Reg. 314 (Dep't Interior 1979) (proposed Nov. 26, 1979).
17. Congress actually passed ICWA because of its trepidations over the ability of state courts to
decide what is in the best interest of the Indian child. See In re Armell, 550 N.E.2d 1060, 1068 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1990). As a Texas appellate court held when it rejected the "best interest of the child"
standard in denying a transfer of jurisdiction, "the use of the best interest standard when determining
whether good cause exists defeats the very purpose for which ICWA was enacted, for it allows Anglo
cultural biases into the picture." Yavapai-Apache Tribe v. Mejia, 906 S.W.2d 152, 169 (Tex. App.
1995); see also Michael J. Dale, State Court Jurisdiction Under the Indian Child Welfare Act and the
Unstated Best Interest of the Child Test, 27 GONZ. L. REV. 353, 387 (1992).
18. As this article will examine, Congress must have contemplated that certain state courts would
not comply with the statute because they included in the act a provision allowing a "court of competent
jurisdiction" to invalidate state court action taken in violation of the portions of the act mandating
compliance with procedure. See 25 U.S.C. § 1914 (1994). Parties who have attempted to utilize this
section of the Act have invariably been confronted with the federalism problems raised by requesting
that a federal court invalidate a domestic relations action of a state court, an area traditionally
controlled by state law.
19. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971); Morrow v. Winslow, 94 F.3d 1386, 1393
(10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1311 (1996).
20. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994).
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indispensable roles in the violation of the cultural rights of Indian
children and tribes.
Further, this article will discuss the need for some federal court inter-
cession to correct the rampant violations of ICWA in certain states.
Federal courts have a moral imperative to step into this fray and rescue
ICWA from the vagaries of state judicial power, not only under the ban-
ner of uniformity but also because of the role the federal government
played in the forced displacement of Indian children. 2' The policy of
cultural displacement, which ICWA attempts to redress via reform to the
state judicial process, was the aftermath of a federal policy of moral
assimilation which state courts and agencies perpetuated under their
recognized authority in the area of domestic relations. Viewed in this
light, the unwillingness of the federal courts to exercise some supervisory
authority over the continued erosion of ICWA is a further abdication of
the federal trust responsibility to promote strong Indian families and
tribes.22
Finally, just as with other federal civil rights statutes, 23 Congress
clearly intended for the federal courts to play a role in correcting
erroneous state court ICWA decisions.24 This intent is symbolized by 25
21. See Patrice H. Kunesh, Transcending Frontiers: Indian Child Welfare in the United States, 16
B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 17 (1996) (discussing the federal policy of assimilating Indians into mainstream
Christian society). Indian children were often removed from their families for most of their youth and
placed in boarding schools. Id. at 22. The schools were usually Christian boarding schools contracting
with the United States government, Id. In these schools, the children were prohibited from speaking
their native languages, practicing their religion, and of course learning the traditional mores of their
extended families and tribes. See id.; see also FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OFFEDERAL INDIAN LAW
139-41 (1982). This displacement was achieved through federal statutes that required Indian families
to send their children to boarding school or risk losing their food rations. Kunesh, supra.
22. See COHEN, supra note 21, at 221. "Trust responsibility," in the parlance of modem Indian
law jurisprudence, denotes the fiduciary and moral obligations the United States government has
toward Indian tribes and their members. As one commentator has suggested, this relationship is "one
of the primary cornerstones of Indian law." Id. This unique relationship has been defined as a
political relationship of the United States toward "a nation claiming and receiving the protection of one
more powerful: not that of individuals abandoning their national character, and submitting as subjects
to the laws of the master." Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 555 (1832). The relationship is
embodied in numerous legislative enactments, including ICWA, the Snyder Act, 25 U.S.C. § 13 (1994)
(authorizing sufficient appropriations for the benefit, care and assistance of Indians throughout the
United States), and the Indian Self-Determination Act, 25 U.S.C. § 450 (1994) (authorizing Indian
tribes to operate programs formerly operated by the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Indian Health
Service).
23. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (concluding that the "separate
but equal" doctrine violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause).
24. Federal courts have been admittedly averse to concluding that the enactment of a federal
civil rights statute designed to protect persons against violations of federal rights by persons acting
under color of state law is ipso facto an exception to the federal full faith and credit statute. See Allen
v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 101 (1980) (stating that Congress did not exempt 42 U.S.C. § 1983 from
application of the full faith and credit requirement by vesting the federal courts with jurisdiction over
civil rights violations by state actors). However, 25 U.S.C. § 1914 of ICWA differs from other civil
rights jurisdictional statutes because it grants federal courts the authority to invalidate state court
action, not just to provide a remedy for a person whose rights were violated by a state actor. 25 U.S.C.
§ 1914 (1994) (emphasis added).
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U.S.C. § 1914, a provision of ICWA that vests federal courts with the
authority to overrule erroneous state court decisions, notwithstanding the
federal full faith and credit statute. 25
I. THE EXISTING INDIAN FAMILY EXCEPTION
To Indian families and tribes, there is no more pernicious develop-
ment in the application of the Indian Child Welfare Act than the con-
tinued expansion of the "existing Indian family exception." 26 This
doctrine recognizes an exception to the application of ICWA in cases
involving an Indian child who has never resided with an "Indian
family." 27 The doctrine was originally conjured up to defeat the
application of the Act in cases where Indian children were being
removed from non-Indian parents, often with the parents' consent, and
placed in non-Indian homes over the objection of the non-custodial
Indian parent who had little contact with the children. 28 The doctrine
was expanded, however, to encompass situations where an Indian parent
placed her child with non-Indian parents shortly after the child's birth. 29
The United States Supreme Court arguably disavowed the exception
in this second scenario in 1989, when the Court overruled a Mississippi
Supreme Court decision which had used the exception. 30 Unfortunately,
25. This article suggests that Congress did not intend to merely vest federal courts with juris-
diction over actions seeking to invalidate state court action taken in contravention of ICWA by enact-
ment of section § 1914, but intended to expressly except ICWA from the requirements of the federal
full faith and credit statute. This is the only reasonable interpretation of § 1914 which does not render
it a nullity.
26. The alarm created by the notion that a state court should be able to unilaterally determine
who is an "Indian child" without tribal input can be seen in the reaction of Indian tribes and leaders to
a legislative proposal, the Adoption Promotion and Stability Act of 1996, that passed the House of
Representatives in 1996. The Act required state courts, before applying ICWA, to determine if the
child in question is the natural child of a parent who "maintains significant social, cultural, or political
affiliation with the Indian tribe of which either parent is a member." H.R. REP. No. 104-542, at 4
(1996). There was uniform tribal opposition to this proposal which eventually led to its demise in the
Senate Committee on Indian Affairs. See S. REP. No. 104-288, at 9 (1996); Eric Schmitt, Adoption Bill
Facing Battle Over Measure on Indians, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1996 at AI.
27. Courts differ on what subgroup of the family should be looked at to determine whether an
Indian child has lived with an "Indian family," with most courts apparently concluding that the entire
extended family should be looked to, whereas at least one has looked only to the natural parents as
being the relevant "family." See Rye v. Weasel, 934 S.W.2d 257, 254 (Ky. 1996) (holding that a child
who lived with an Indian uncle and his non-Indian wife almost her entire life was not an Indian child
under the Act because the child had never lived with Indian natural parents).
28. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168, 175 (Kan. 1982); Hampton v. J.A.L.,
658 So. 2d 331, 335 (La. Ct. App. 1995); In re Adoption of Baby Boy D., 742 P.2d 1059, 1063 (Okla.
1985).
29. See, e.g., In re Adoption of T.R.M., 525 N.E.2d 298, 303 (Ind. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S.
1069 (1989); In re B.B., 511 So.2d 918, 921 (Miss. 1987), rev'd sub nom. Mississippi Band of Choctaw
Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989).
30. See Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 54. Consequently, the South Dakota Supreme Court expressly held
that the Supreme Court's decision in Holyfield had rendered invalid its previous holding in Claymore v.
Serr, 405 N.W.2d 650 (S.D. 1987), and held that ICWA applied to any Indian child regardless of
whether the child lived in an Indian family. See In re Adoption of Baade, 462 N.W.2d 485, 490 (S.D.
1990).
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that ruling has not prevented several state courts from finding more
ingenious ways to apply the exception. Two California appellate courts
have determined that the exception should not only apply to children
who have only resided short periods of time with Indian persons, but also
to Indian children who have resided with Indian persons who have no
significant political, cultural, or social ties with their tribe. 31 Another
court has carried the exception even further, applying it to a child who
resided nearly her entire life with her Indian uncle.32 However, because
she resided off her Tribe's reservation and because she had never
resided with Indian biological parents, the court held that she never
really lived in an Indian family. 33
A. THE BEGINNING OF THE EXISTING INDIAN FAMILY EXCEPTION
Congress intended ICWA to apply to any child custody pro-
ceeding 34 involving an Indian child, including both involuntary and
voluntary proceedings. 35 However, numerous detractors of applying
ICWA to voluntary placement proceedings, including several state courts,
have stepped forward to challenge the application of ICWA in such
31. See In re Alexandria Y., 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 679 (Ct. App. 1996); In re Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr.
2d 507 (Ct. App. 1996).
32. See Rye, 934 S.W.2d at 257.
33. Id.
34. The term "child custody proceeding" in domestic relations vernacular is generally thought to
mean custody disputes between parents in a divorce or other proceeding. This is not the same defini-
tion under ICWA as custody proceedings between parents are explicitly exempted from coverage.
See 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1) (1994) (exempting custody disputes in divorce proceedings); see also In re
Defender, 435 N.W.2d 717, 721-22 (S.D. 1989) (exempting custody disputes between unwed parents
exempted from ICWA coverage). Under ICWA, "child custody proceedings" are: 1) any voluntary
or involuntary placements of Indian children outside their home where custody of the children cannot
be regained upon demand (foster care placement); 2) proceedings that result in the termination of
parental rights over an Indian child, either voluntarily or involuntarily; 3) placements after termination
of parental rights but prior to adoption; and 4) adoptive placements. See 25 U.S.C. § 1903(l)(i-iv)
(1994).
35. Congress's concern with "voluntary placements" is palpable in the legislative history. In the
House Report there were references to numerous "voluntary" placements of Indian children by their
parents who had been coerced by state social workers into giving up their children. H.R. REP. No.
95-1386, at 11 (1978). reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7533. When viewed in light of several
federal statutes which historically had forced Indian families to give up their children, Congress
obviously was concerned that many Indian families were being coerced into giving up their children.
See Appropriations Act of March 3, 1893, ch. 209, § 1, 27 Stat. 612, 628 (formerly codified at 25
U.S.C. § 283) (requiring Indian parents or guardians to send their children to schools or have rations
cut off).
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proceedings. 36 This disenchantment with applying ICWA to voluntary
placements has been extended by some courts to the point where the
protections of the Act only apply in cases where an Indian family, who
maintained significant political and cultural ties with their tribe, is tempo-
rarily located off the reservation when their child was removed. 37 In
such a case the state courts already would have no jurisdiction under the
present state of the law. 38 Thus ICWA, if left to the machinations of
certain state courts, is on the road to eradication. 39
The genesis of the existing Indian family exception lies with a
Kansas Supreme Court decision, Baby Boy L.40 In that case, the court
held that ICWA should not apply to an adoption proceeding involving
an illegitimate Indian child born to a non-Indian mother and an
incarcerated Indian father when the natural mother was seeking to
36. It is in the area of voluntary proceedings, where parents are exercising what has been
perceived in the non-Indian world as a parental prerogative to place a child, that commentators and
courts have questioned the propriety of applying ICWA. See Christine D. Bakeis, The Indian Child
Welfare Act of 1978: Violating Personal Rights for the Sake of the Tribe, 10 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHIcs
& PUB. POL'Y 543, 544 (1996) (contending that the provision of ICWA governing voluntary placements
violates the rights of Indian parents); see also In re Baby Girl A., 282 Cal. Rptr. 2d 105 (Ct. App. 1993)
(suggesting that an Indian mother raised by non-Indians would have the right to place her own child
for adoption with non-Indians over a Tribe's objection); Russell Lawrence Barsh, The Indian Child
Welfare Act of 1978: A Critical Analysis, 31 HAsnTNGs L.J. 1287 (1980). It is not surprising, therefore,
that it is in this area that courts initially created the existing Indian family exception. However,
because those cases did not rely upon the voluntariness of the actions of the non-Indian parents who
placed their children, but instead on the status of the child, the logic of those cases would extend even
to those cases where an Indian child is being involuntarily removed from a parent, whether Indian or
non-Indian.
37. For instance, the Kentucky Supreme Court recently held that ICWA does not apply to an
Indian child who was a ward of the tribal court and who had lived almost her entire life with her
Indian uncle because the child had lived most of her life off the reservation. See Rye, 934 S.W.2d at
263.
38. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1911(a), 1922 (1994) (allowing state courts to only exercise emergency
jurisdiction over a reservation-domiciled Indian child temporarily located off the reservation).
39. One need not be a statistician to understand the consequences of the statistics cited by Con-
gress in demonstrating the gravity of the removal rates of Indian children from their tribes on the
survival of Indian tribes. In Minnesota, for example, in one year an astonishing one out of every four
Indian children under the age of one year was adopted out, usually to non-Indian adoptive parents.
See H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, at 9 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7531. Such a removal
rate, extrapolated over even a short period of time and combined with other states which have similar
removal rates, compels the conclusion that there are hundreds of thousands of Indian children who
were raised primarily by non-Indians and who are now parents of their own children. In fact, many
of the cases involving ICWA involve such parents. See In re Baby Girl A., 282 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 105.
"Culturally, the chances of Indian survival are significantly reduced if our children, the only real
means for the transmission of the tribal heritage, are to be raised in non-Indian homes and denied
exposure to the ways of their People." Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 33,
34 (1988) (quoting the testimony of Chief Calvin Isaac of the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians
during the 1978 hearings on ICWA).
These families and their tribes should be the primary beneficiaries of a federal law designed to
restore the sanctity and strength of Indian tribes by bringing those families, torn asunder by the policies
of assimilation and affiliated by name only with their tribe, back into the fold. It was the author's
experience in practicing on several reservations for over 12 years that many of the parents who wish
to place their children outside of the tribe for placements themselves had been reared outside of the
tribe and were taught to be ashamed of their status as Indians.
40. 643 P.2d 168 (Kan. 1982).
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voluntarily place her child for adoption with a non-Indian couple. The
Kansas Supreme Court upheld a lower court decision which had found
that applying ICWA in such a situation would be maladroit because the
intent of the Act was to prevent the breakup of Indian families. Since
the Indian child had never lived in an Indian home, no Indian family
would be broken up and thus the protections of ICWA need not, and
therefore did not, apply.
In affirming the lower court's decision, the court utilized the legis-
lative history behind the enactment of ICWA to conclude that the
purposes of the Act would not be served by applying it to a voluntary
adoptive placement of an Indian child born to a non-Indian mother.4 '
Notwithstanding the court's acknowledgment that the Act literally
applied, (the adoptive placement was a "child custody proceeding" as
defined by the Act and the minor child was an Indian child because the
child was enrolled with the Kiowa tribe), the court opted to redraft the
statute to conform it to what the court felt Congress actually intended. 42
Baby Boy L. has been the subject of numerous commentaries, both
pro and con. 43 Surprisingly, few have attempted to counter the basic
assumption underlying the decision-that the application of ICWA to
such a case is inconsistent with the legislative history of the Act.
Actually, the Kansas Supreme Court, as well as numerous other courts
which have adopted the exception, have used sleight of hand to find that
the application of ICWA in cases where Indian children are being volun-
tarily placed is inconsistent with the Act's legislative history. These
courts explain that the intent of Congress in enacting the provisions was
only to address the involuntary removal of Indian children from their
homes.44
41. In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168, 176 (Kan. 1982).
42. It should be noted that the existing Indian family exception is not the result of ambiguous
language utilized by Congress in the enactment of ICWA. Even those courts which have adopted the
exception have frankly acknowledged that ICWA, on its face, applies to all child custody proceedings
involving Indian children, even those who have not been exposed to a traditional family setting. See,
e.g., Hampton v. J.A.L., 658 So. 2d 331, 352 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (Stewart, J. dissenting).
43. See, e.g., Toni Hahn Davis, The Existing Indian Family Exception to the Indian Child Welfare
Act, 69 N.D. L. REV. 465, 489-90 (1993); Michelle L. Lehmann, Comment, The Indian Child Welfare
Act of 1978: Does it Apply to the Adoption of an Illegitimate Child, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 511, 534
(1989).
44. In many of the cases where courts have adopted the exception, special reference has been
made to a congressional finding in 25 U.S.C. § 1901(4) (1994), which expresses congressional concern
with the alarmingly high percentage of "Indian families" which were being broken up by the unwar-
ranted removal of Indian children from their families. This finding is used to support the proposition
that ICWA is only designed to prevent the involuntary removal of Indian children from their Indian
families. The second and third findings of that same section, where Congress stated that Indian chil-
dren were vital to the continued existence and integrity of Indian tribes, are hardly ever mentioned in
this analysis. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(2) - (3) (1994). These sections contravene the assumption of these
courts that preventing the removal of Indian children, rather than dictating where these children
should be placed, is the sole motivating cause of Congress in enacting ICWA.
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It may be true that applying ICWA to the voluntary placement of an
Indian child by a non-Indian parent does not perpetuate Congress'
objective of preventing the unwarranted removal of Indian children from
their families because of cultural ignorance or bias. However, ICWA not
only applies to the involuntary break-up of Indian families, but also
applies to the voluntary removal of Indian children from their families
for placement in non-Indian homes for adoption.4 5 The psychological
and sociological studies cited by Congress in support of the proposition
that the placement of Indian children in non-Indian homes impacted
their well-being and that of the tribes did not differentiate between those
children placed after a forced break-up, of the Indian family
(involuntary) and those placed voluntarily either by an Indian or non-
Indian parent. 46 Furthermore, Congress sought to proscribe the volun-
tary placement of very young Indian children in foster and adoptive
homes because this practice is susceptible to abuse by both state officials
and private entities. In short, constructing the future bond between
Indian children and their heritage served just as valuable a function in
the origins of ICWA as preventing the break-up of a present union.
B. VARIATIONS OF THE EXISTING FAMILY EXCEPTION
Baby Boy L. could be perceived as an aberration if it had been
limited to its unique facts-a non-Indian parent voluntarily placing an
Indian child who had experienced no contact with the Indian parent or
extended family. However, the existing Indian family exception
45. If this were not true, there would be no need for 25 U.S.C. § 1913 (1994), governing the
voluntary placement of Indian children, and 25 U.S.C. § 1915 (1994), governing the placement of
Indian children in both voluntary and involuntary proceedings. It is wrong for a court to rely
exclusively on the intent of Congress to curtail the involuntary removal of Indian children from their
families to bolster the propriety of the "existing Indian family" exception to ICWA. Such reliance
ignores the discrete and equally important congressional goal of protecting the integrity of Indian
tribes by keeping their children in homes that reflect the traditions and values of the Tribe.
46. One of the most convincing studies relied upon by Congress in enacting the placement
preference provisions of the act was completed by Dr. Joseph Westermeyer, a University of
Minnesota social psychiatrist. Westermeyer conducted a study of Indian children raised in white
homes and concluded that:
[T]hey were raised with a white cultural and social identity. They are raised in a
white home. They attended, predominately white schools, and almost in all cases,
attended a church that was predominately white, and really came to understand very
little about Indian culture, Indian behavior and had virtually no viable Indian identity.
Then during adolescence they were to find that society was not to grant them the
white identity that they had.
They were finding that society was putting on them an identity which they didn't
possess and taking from them an identity that they did possess.
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 33 (1989); see also Joseph
Westermeyer, The Apple Syndrome in Minnesota: A Complication of Racial-Ethnic Discontinuity, 10
J. OPERATIONAL PSYCHIATRY 134-140 (1979).
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continues to rear its head in other factual circumstances and now has
numerous variations among the states. There appear to be five different
variations of the exception at present.
The first type is evidenced by Baby Boy L. and involves an Indian
child born to a non-Indian mother who subsequently looks to place the
child 47 or against whom an involuntary petition is filed.48 The second
exception involves an Indian child born to an Indian parent or Indian
parents who then seek to place the child during infancy. 49 The third
exception has become of vogue in California and involves an Indian
child who is eligible for membership in a tribe, but whose Indian parent
lacks sufficient contacts with the tribe to justify calling the parent an
"Indian." 50 The fourth variation of the exception arises when the child
has lived with an Indian caretaker much of her life, but the Indian
parents have had limited contact with her and she has not lived on or
near an Indian reservation so that the home cannot be considered an In-
dian home.51 Lastly, some courts have decided that ICWA should apply,
but that certain evidentiary rules need not be complied with under ICWA,
specifically the requirement that qualified expert testimony be offered to
47. Other cases recognizing this exception are an Alabama appellate court in S.A. v. E.J.P., 571
So. 2d 1187-89 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990), an Arizona appellate court in In re Appeal in Maricopa County,
667 P.2d 228, 233 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983), a Missouri appellate court in In re S.A.M., 703 S.W.2d
603-08 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986), and the Oklahoma Supreme Court in In re Adoption of Baby Boy D., 742
P.2d 1059, 1063-64 (Okla. 1985),; Hajo v. Duello, 484 U.S. 1072 (1988). But see Claymore v. Serr,
405 N.W.2d 650, 653 (S.D. 1987). Claymore was effectively overruled by the South Dakota Supreme
Court in In re Adoption of Baade, 462 N.W.2d 485, 489 (S.D. 1990). The Oklahoma decisions have
also been effectively overruled by the Oklahoma legislature adopting OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §
40.3(B) (West Supp. 1997), which expressly states that ICWA should apply regardless of whether or
not the children are in the legal or physical custody of an Indian parent or custodian when proceedings
are commenced.
48. See C.E.H. v. L.M.V., 837 S.W.2d 947, 952 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (suggesting that the existing
Indian family exception is doctrinally correct but goes on to apply ICWA to cover all bases); In re
S.C., 833 P.2d 1249, 1255 (Okla. 1992).
49. This exception is exemplified by the Indiana Supreme Court's decision in In re Adoption of
T.R.M., 525 N.E. 2d 298, 303 (Ind. 1988), the Mississippi Supreme Court decision in In re B.B., 511 So.
2d 918, 919 (Miss. 1987), a Louisiana appellate court in Hampton v. J.A.L., 658 So. 2d 331, 335 (La.
Ct. App. 1995), and to a lesser extent the Washington Supreme Court decision in In re Crews, 825 P.2d
305 (Wash. 1992). Crews actually foreshadowed a new type of exception. See supra notes 73-90 and
accompanying text.
50. See In re Alexandria Y., 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 679, 683 (Ct. App. 1996); In re Bridget R., 49 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 507, 526 (Ct. App. 1996). These California appellate cases, along with the Washington
Supreme Court in In re Crews, actually recognize a new type of exception where the court's emphasis
is not upon the duration of an Indian child's relationship with his or her Indian family, but the quality of
"Indian life" that the natural parents have lived up to the point of the commencement of proceedings
in state court. Under these cases it is irrelevant if an Indian child has lived with his or her natural
Indian parents his or her entire life, if the parents themselves do not have sufficient ties to the tribe
where they are members.
51. See Rye v. Weasel, 934 S.W.2d 257, 263 (Ky. 1996).
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support the removal of an Indian child from his or her family. 52 Each
of these variations of the existing Indian family exception will be
discussed in turn.
1. The Baby Boy L. Exception
After Baby Boy L., several decisions from various courts recognized
a similar exception. In many of these cases, it is unclear whether the
court in question recognized an exception to the Indian Child Welfare
Act or merely concluded that the Indian parent challenging the adoptive
placement was not a "parent" as defined by the Act. 53 For example, in
In re Baby Boy D.,54 the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that an Indian
father of an illegitimate child who had not acknowledged the child prior
to an adoption proceeding lacked standing as a parent under ICWA to
challenge the adoptive placement of his child.55 The court parlayed that
limited holding into a broad declaration that the Indian Child Welfare
Act should not apply to the removal of an Indian child from a non-
Indian mother when the child has not resided with an Indian caretaker,
thereby sanctioning the line of reasoning in Baby Boy L.
Several other courts concurred with the analysis in Baby Boy L. and
Baby Boy D. and concluded that ICWA should not apply to an adoption
proceeding involving a non-Indian mother and an Indian father who had
minimal contact or no contact at all with the Indian child.56 In addition,
the New Jersey Supreme Court, in a similar factual scenario, held that an
Indian father who had never acknowledged his child, lacked standing to
challenge the child's adoption. Interestingly, the New Jersey Court went
on to reject the existing Indian family exception to the Indian Child
Welfare Act as an aberration. 57 Thus, courts have chosen not to apply
ICWA to proceedings that lead to the removal of an Indian child by
either explicitly following Baby Boy L. or by using its rationale
52. See Long v. State Dep't Human Serv., 527 So. 2d 133, 136 (Ala. Civ. App. 1988); In re N.L.,
754 P.2d 863, 867 (Okla. 1988); Children's Serv. v. Campbell, 857 P.2d 888, 889 (Or.. Ct. App. 1993);
Juvenile Dep't v. Tucker, 710 P.2d 793, 799 (Or. Ct. App. 1985). These courts have held that unless
the reason for the removal of an Indian child involves some allegation that is susceptible to cultural
biases, the state court need not receive the testimony of a qualified expert witness as required by 25
U.S.C. §§ 1912(e) and (f), for the foster care placement or termination of parental rights of an Indian
child.
53. "Parent" is defined under the Act at 25 U.S.C. § 1903(9) (1994), and specifically excludes
the father of an Indian child born out of wedlock unless the father has acknowledged his paternity or
has been adjudicated the father.
54. 742 P.2d 1059 (Okla. 1985).
55. In re Baby Boy D., 742 P.2d 1059, 1064 (Okla. 1985).
56. See note 47 and accompanying text.
57. See In re Adoption of a Baby Child, 543 A.2d 925, 936-37 (N.J. 1988). The New Jersey
Supreme Court in this case, where an Indian mother placed her child for adoption without the
knowledge of the natural father, held that the Act applied and rejected the existing Indian family
exception. Id. The Court concluded, however that the alleged father was not the father under ICWA
at the time of the adoption proceedings. Id.
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implicitly to say that a child with an unacknowledged Indian father is not
"Indian" under the law.
2. A Child Placed During Infancy
The existing Indian family exception detoured from the route
chosen by the Kansas Supreme Court with decisions from the Indiana
Supreme Court 58 and the Mississippi Supreme Court. 59 These decisions
are the precursors for more contemporary decisions on the exception.
In these cases, the courts recognized an exception to the Act for Indian
children who had not resided in Indian families long enough to justify
application of the Act, rather than examining whether the child had ever
resided with an Indian custodian.
In the Indiana decision, the court held that the Act should not apply
to an Indian child who was placed for adoption by an Oglala Sioux In-
dian mother five days after the birth of the child (in violation of numer-
ous provisions of ICWA), because the child had resided most of her life
with a non-Indian couple. 60 Although the Indiana Supreme Court was
obviously hostile to the entire Act, suggesting in strong language that
Congress lacked the authority to instruct Indiana courts how to handle
custody proceedings involving Indian children, its obvious disdain for
the voluntary placement provisions of the Act is most alarming. The
court, in essence, held that the Indian Child Welfare Act should never
apply to a voluntary placement of an Indian child by the child's Indian
parents shortly after birth, conceivably because the child had not resided
with the Indian parent long enough to justify invoking the Act. 6 1 Of
course, such reasoning nullifies the provisions of the Act restricting the
voluntary placement of Indian children shortly after birth, a practice
which Congress clearly felt was being abused by state and private
adoptions agencies. 62
58. In re Adoption of T.R.M., 525 N.E.2d 298 (Ind. 1988).
59. In re B.B., 511 So. 2d 918 (Miss. 1987). The court did not expressly declare that ICWA did
not apply, but did hold that an Indian parent should be able to place twins for adoption without
implicating the exclusive tribal interests expressed at 25 U.S.C. § 1919(a). Id. at 921.
60. In re T.R.M., 525 N.E.2d at 302-05.
61. Id. at 303-05.
62. ICWA renders void the consent to placement or voluntary termination of parental rights
rendered before the Indian child is ten days old. See 25 U.S.C. § 1913(a) (1994). The Act also
requires that consent of the parent be consummated before a court of competent jurisdiction with a
degree of formality. Id. ICWA also allows an Indian parent to withdraw a valid consent and regain
custody of the child upon demand. See 25 U.S.C. § 1913(b) (1994). Such a scenario occurred in In re
T.R.M., 525 N.E.2d at 302. In T.R.M., the Indiana trial court that granted the adoption arguably did not
even have jurisdiction to do so because of 25 U.S.C. § 1920 (1994), which requires a state court to
decline to exercise jurisdiction over a proceeding commenced by a party who gained custody of an
Indian child in violation of ICWA or who retains custody in violation of ICWA. See In re T.R.M., 525
N.E.2d at 302. The adoptive couple in T.R.M. did violate the Act because the natural mother
attempted to regain the custody of the child, but was wrongfully rebuffed by the adoptive parents
before the adoption proceeding was commenced. See id.
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In a similar vein, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that ICWA did
not bar a state court adoption of Indian twins born to reservation-
domiciled Indian .parents because such an application of ICWA would
defeat the allegedly clearly expressed intent of the natural parents to
place their children for adoption: 63 The court concluded that the
children at issue were domiciled off the reservation at the time of the
placement, despite the fact that the parents were only located off the
reservation temporarily to give birth. The court therefore exercised its
jurisdiction over the adoption proceeding. The court did not address
directly the application of ICWA except to state that the lower court had
acted within the parameters of the Act.64
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Mississippi Supreme
Court in Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield65 and held
that the state court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the adoption because
the children were domiciled on the reservation and under ICWA, were
exclusively within the jurisdiction of the tribal court. 66 By implication,
the Supreme Court directed that ICWA should apply to voluntary
adoption proceedings involving Indian children, arguably rendering
suspect the Kansas Supreme Court's decision in Baby Boy L. and its
progeny. 67 Unfortunately, the Court did not squarely address the viabili-
ty of an exception to ICWA for Indian children who either resided for
only short periods of time with their Indian families or who never
resided with an Indian relative, most likely because the lower court failed
to clearly articulate the exception.
In Holyfield, the Court made other determinations which militate
against state courts rewriting ICWA to prevent -its application to certain
Indian children. In rejecting the argument that Mississippi law should
63. InreB.B.,511 So. 2dat921.
64. See id.
65. 490 U.S. 30 (1989).
66. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 53 (1989). Holyfield is
important to any discussion of the existing Indian family exception for numerous reasons, not the least
being the fact that the fact scenario in Holyfield (Indian parents voluntarily surrendering their children
after birth) is very similar to the cases in which the exception was adopted. See, e.g., In re T.R.M.,
525 N.E.2d at 298. The Supreme Court in Holyfield, by holding that ICWA applied in the Mississippi
case so as to defeat the Mississippi court's attempt to assert jurisdiction, implicitly held that ICWA
applies to voluntary placements of Indian children shortly after birth. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 53. This
holding is contrary to other state court decisions. Attempts to limit Holyfield to the Court's decision on
domicile, for example, ignore the fact that the Court would have never reached the domicile issue
without deciding that ICWA applies to these types of proceedings. See, e.g., In re Alexandria Y., 53
Cal. Rptr. 2d 679, 687 (Ct. App. 1996); Hampton v. J.A.L., 658 So. 2d 331, 335 (La. Ct. App. 1995); In
re Crews, 825 A.2d 305, 310 (Wash. 1992).
67. See Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 49. By clearly expressing that the Indian tribe where the child was
a member, or eligible for membership, had a tangible interest in the proceedings which could not be
nullified by the actions of the natural parents the court demonstrated that the Indian family was not the
only entity being protected. Id. "The numerous prerogatives accorded the tribe through ICWA's
substantive provisions.., must, accordingly, be seen as a means of protecting not only the interests of
individual Indian children, but also of the tribes themselves." Id. (emphasis added).
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determine the domicile of the twins, the Holyfield Court held that it was
"highly improbable that Congress would have intended to leave the
scope of the statute's key jurisdictional provisions to definition by state
courts." 68 Although the Court was not discussing state courts tinkering
with the definition of "Indian child" under ICWA, this language clearly
should dissuade state courts from reinterpreting ICWA in a manner that
minimizes its employment.
Since Holyfield, the plight of the existing Indian family exception
has been a "long and strange trip." 69 One of the first courts to construe
Holyfield was the South Dakota Supreme Court, which reversed its
previous adoption of the existing Indian family exception based upon
the Holyfield decision. 70 The court held that the application of ICWA to
a particular case should hinge exclusively on whether an Indian child is
involved, not whether the child has lived in an existing Indian family. 71
What was clear to the South Dakota Supreme Court regarding Holy-
field was apparently nebulous to other courts, which continued to invoke
the exception in even more extreme manners. The Oklahoma Supreme
Court reiterated its belief in the exception by holding that ICWA did not
apply to the foster care placement of an Indian child removed from a
non-Indian mother, one of the first cases recognizing the exception in a
case not started as a voluntary proceeding by the non-Indian parent. 72
The favorable, pro-tribal interpretation of ICWA contained in Holyfield
did not therefore prove to be the antidote to the existing Indian family
exception that tribes hoped. Instead, the exception was broadened even
further after Holyfield.
68. See id. at 45.
69. GRATEFUL DEAD, Trucking, American Beauty (Warner Bros. 1970).
70. In re Baade, 462 N.W.2d 485, 489 (S.D. 1990) (overturning Claymore v. Serr, 405 N.W.2d
650 (SD 1987)).
71. Id.
72. See In re S.C., 833 P.2d 1249, 1251 (Okla. 1992). S.C. is a strange case because it involved
an Indian father, who allegedly had little contact with his children (borne by a non-Indian mother),
invoking 25 U.S.C. § 1914 (1994) of ICWA in an attempt to invalidate a foster care placement of his
Indian children with an Indian foster home. Id. The lower courts denied the petition on the ground
that the father lacked standing under § 1914 because he was not a parent from whom custody had
been removed and also because the children were not removed from an existing Indian family. Id. at
253. The court distinguished Holyfield on the ground that it stood only for the proposition that state
courts should not apply state law on domicile. Id. at 1254. The court further held that Holyfield had no
bearing on the continued validity of the existing Indian family exception. Id. The case is odd because
the court could have ruled that, on its face, § 1914 does not permit challenges to foster care placements
from a non-custodial parent. See 25 U.S.C. § 1914 (1994). Instead, the court strained to reconcile its
ruling with the Holyfield decision. The Oklahoma legislature has apparently repealed the decision in
S.C. by its passage of an amended state ICWA making it clear that ICWA does apply to any
proceeding wherein an Indian child is removed, irrespective of whether the child is being removed
from an existing Indian family. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 40.3 (West Supp. 1997).
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3. Determining "Indian Child" Based Upon Tribal
Attachment or State Law
In In re Crews, the Washington Supreme Court addressed the Indian
Child Welfare Act for the first time. In an en banc decision, the court
looked at the application of ICWA to an Indian mother who voluntarily
consented to the termination of her parental rights and to an adoptive
placement (in violation of ICWA) and then attempted to revoke her
consent. 73 The court, in apparent incongruity with Holyfield, held that
ICWA did not apply to a voluntary placement of an Indian child shortly
after the child's birth.74 The court noted that the minor child had never
resided with her Indian mother, the mother had never resided on or near
the Choctaw reservation where she became a member after the birth of
the child, and (in a rather cryptic note) suggested that the child, if
returned to the mother, would probably never live in an Indian environ-
ment because of the natural mother's neglect of her Indian heritage. 75
In an interesting sleight of hand, the Crews court cited Holyfield in
support of the proposition that ICWA should not apply to the voluntary
placement of an Indian child by his Indian parent,76 notwithstanding the
similar factual circumstances presented in Holyfield where Indian parents
voluntarily consented to an adoption by a non-Indian couple. The
Crews court seemed to distinguish Holyfield on the grounds that the
mother in Crews did not live on a reservation and did not have connec-
tions to her Indian heritage, issues that were irrelevant to the Court's
decision in Holyfield.77
Crews set a dangerous precedent in the eyes of many in Indian
country because, for the first time, a state court endorsed the notion that
73. In re Crews, 825 P.2d 305, 307-08 (Wash. 1992).
74. See id. at 312.
75. Id. at 310. In a subsequent appeals court decision, a Washington court distinguished Crews
and applied ICWA in a case involving a child raised primarily in a non-Indian home where the natural
parents were seeking to voluntarily terminate their parental rights. In re M. v. Navajo Nation, 832
P.2d 518, 522 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992). That court seemed to believe that Crews was an aberration. Id.
76. In re Crews, 825 P.2d at 310. The Crews court placed heavy emphasis on distinguishing the
fact that the parents in Holyfield apparently intended to reside on the reservation whereas the mother
in Crews had no intention to live on a reservation. Id. The court seemed to believe the key to appli-
cation of the Act to voluntary proceedings is whether the child would be brought up in a traditional
Indian family if the consent is revoked and the child returned. Id. It is ironic that this distinction was
seized upon by the court as a distinguishing characteristic because the parents in Holyfield apparently
never sought to regain custody of their children and were perfectly content with the children being
raised in a non-Indian home. See Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30
(1989). Whereas the mother in Crews made every attempt to revoke the consent she executed shortly
after the birth of the child, thus evidencing her desire that her child not be raised in a non-Indian
home. See In re Crews, 925 P.2d at 310.
77. See Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 52. The domicile of the parents in Holyfield was important in the
Supreme Court's jurisdictional analysis, as it led the Court to hold that the twins in Holyfield were
domiciliaries of the reservation. Id. at 53. That factor, however, was not mentioned as a prerequisite
to the application of ICWA.
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it should be the ultimate arbiter of whether a person, irrespective of mem-
bership or qualification of membership in an Indian tribe, should be
considered an Indian based upon the state court's perception of whether
that person had sufficient contacts with his or her Indian heritage. 7 8
Before Crews, the relevant consideration in determining whether the
existing Indian family exception applied in a particular case was the
amount of time the child had spent with an Indian family member.
Crews endorsed a new stratagem: whether the Indian caretaker was
sufficiently "Indian" to justify application of the Act. Several courts
have taken the rationale of Crews and have run with it, with courts in
California going so far as to constitutionalize its holding. 79
Louisiana deserves the award for creativity in maneuvering to defeat
the application of ICWA. In a case involving a dispute over visitation (a
proceeding not even governed by the Indian Child Welfare Act) 80
between a non-Indian mother and an Indian father taking place in both
state court and in a tribal forum, a Louisiana appeals court inferentially
held that ICWA's definition of Indian child was superseded by Louisiana
law. 81 In affirming the denial of the Indian father's motion to dismiss
for lack of state court jurisdiction, the court explained that the child of a
Caucasian mother, according to the civil law cited in the Justinian
Institute governing the rights of slaves, assumed the race or free status of
the mother.82 This machination appears to be a clear example of the
78. The Crews court did not appear to find it dispositive that the Choctaw Tribe claimed both
mother and child as members, but instead found it more germane that the mother had no intention to
live on the Choctaw reservation were her child returned to her. In re Crews, 825 P.2d at 310.
79. See In re Alexandria Y., 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 679, 686 (Ct. App. 1996); In re Bridget R., 49 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 507, 516 (Ct. App. 1996).
80. As discussed before, ICWA does not apply to custody disputes between the natural parents of
an Indian child in the course of divorce proceedings or outside of those proceedings. See 25 U.S.C. §
1903(1) (1994); In re Sengstock, 477 N.W.2d 310, 312 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991).
81. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4).
82. See Barbry v. Dauzat, 576 So. 2d 1013, 1021 (La. Ct. App. 1991). In Barbry, the court held
that "a child born of a Caucasian woman and Indian father would be considered a child of the
Caucasian race, as the condition of the mother, and not the quantum of the Indian ancestry of the
child, determines the condition of the offspring." Id. at 1021-22. The court then went on to hold, in a
rather cryptic fashion, that the offspring of an Indian father and Caucasian mother, under federal law,
was not an Indian. Id. at 1022. Although this Louisiana court properly held that ICWA did not apply
to the dispute therein, the holding with regard to the definition of an Indian child may impact the future
application of ICWA in Louisiana. It is clear from the opinion that at least this appellate court believes
that ICWA would never apply to the child of a non-Indian mother. Id.
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Louisiana court misunderstanding that federal law pre-empts state civil
notions regarding the definition of "Indian child."83
Later, in a not so attenuated analysis, another Louisiana appellate
court adopted the reasoning of Crews and the Indiana Supreme Court in
T.R.M. by holding that ICWA did not apply to an Indian mother's
attempt to regain custody of a child placed shortly after the child's
birth.84 The appellate court parroted the.decisions in Crews and T.R.M.
in holding that an Indian mother had no right to withdraw consent to the
voluntary termination of her parental rights or to regain the custody of
her child, both of which are rights reserved to Indian parents who
voluntarily place their children up to the point of termination or adop-
tion, 85 because the act of placing the child in a non-Indian home vitiates
the existing Indian family. 86 In addition to these courts, appellate courts
in Alabama 87 and Missouri 88 have placed their imprimaturs on a similar
existing Indian family exception.
The insinuation in Crews, that a state court should be able to uni-
laterally determine the extent to which Indian parents have maintained
83. ICWA recognizes a tenet of federal Indian law that Indian tribes have the inherent authority
to determine their own tribal membership, free of interference from outside jurisdictions. See Santa
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 (1978) (finding that the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §
1301, did not authorize federal court jurisdiction to enjoin the Santa Clara Pueblo Tribe from applying
its membership rules to deny membership to a Santa Clara female member who marries outside her
tribe); In re Dependency and Neglect of A.L., 442 N.W.2d 233, 235 (S.D. 1989) (noting the Tribe's
declaration that a Caucasian child was a member of Tribe not subject to attack in state court). The
Louisiana Court ignored this principle when it issued this somewhat bizarre ruling. See Barbry, 576
So. 2d at 1021.
84. In re Hampton v. J.A.L., 658 So. 2d 331 (La. Ct. App.. 1995). There the Louisiana appellate
court applied the "existing Indian family" analysis to determine that the child therein was not an Indian
child under the Act. Id. at 337. The natural mother had placed the child in a non-Indian home shortly
after birth, and the natural mother had not lived on the Cheyenne River reservation or any other
reservation for almost nine years. Id. at 332-33. The court distinguished Holyfield on the grounds that
the mother in Hampton was not attempting to circumvent the rights of the Tribe to be involved in the
child's upbringing, thus implying that if she were, ICWA may apply. Id. at 335. This analysis should
be contrasted with the decision in Barbry where the court held that the key in determining whether a
child is an Indian is the status of the mother and nothing else. See Barbry, 576 So. 2d at 1021. These
two cases exemplify how far some state courts will go in attempting to erect hurdles toward the
application of ICWA. In one instance invoking a statute which the Thirteenth Amendment arguably
rescinded, and in the other holding that an Indian mother who wants her Tribe to participate in her
child's life effectively bars the application of ICWA by those wishes, yet theoretically an Indian
mother who wishes to circumvent tribal rights has thereby invoked ICWA.
85. See In re Hampton, 658 So. 2d at 335. ICWA guarantees the right of an Indian parent to with-
draw a consent to adoption up to the point of termination of her parental rights or adoption. See B.R.T.
v. Social Serv. Bd., 391 N.W.2d 594, 599 (N.D. 1986).
86. In further support of its contention that ICWA was designed by Congress to apply to only
Indian children being removed from existing Indian families, the court cited to unsuccessful proposed
congressional legislation in 1987 to purportedly overrule the decisions adopting the exception. See
Hampton, 658 So. 2d at 335. It should be noted that these legislative efforts predated the Supreme
Court decision in Holyfield, which arguably overruled the exception. Furthermore there have been
other unsuccessful legislative efforts to codify the exception. See H.R REP. No. 104-542, at 4 (1996).
87. S.A. v. E.J.P., 571 So. 2d 1187, 1189-90 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990) (holding that a child raised by
a non-Indian mother and non-Indian aunt and uncle, with little contact by Indian father, was not an
Indian child for purposes of ICWA).
88. C.E.H. v. L.M.W., 837 S.W.2d 947,952 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
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sufficient contacts with their tribe to warrant labeling those parents
"Indian," has recently been embraced by two California appellate
courts which have held that such an interpretation of ICWA is necessary
to preserve its constitutionality. 89 These opinions may be harbingers of
future trends in many state courts to severely curtail the rights of Indian
tribes and parents to regain custody of Indian children both voluntarily
and involuntarily removed from them in urban areas far from Indian
reservations. The opinions represent such an extreme antipathy for the
Indian Child Welfare Act that tribal leaders, and those who perceive
problems with ICWA, have attempted to work out their differences to
avoid similar public confrontations in an attempt to salvage ICWA.90
In the first of the California decisions, In re Bridget R.,91 the court
challenged ICWA on almost every premise it is based upon. In Bridget,
an Indian father who consented to a voluntary relinquishment of his
parental rights and placement of his twins with a non-Indian couple in
Ohio (in violation of the Indian Child Welfare Act), 92 attempted to
89. In re Alexandria Y., 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 679, 686 (Ct. App. 1996); In re Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr.
2d 507, 516 (Ct. App. 1996). The conflict in Bridget R. was the subject of much media scrutiny
because the putative adoptive parents, the Rosts from Ohio, decided not only to litigate their case in the
courts of California, but also in the courts of public opinion. See David Diamond, Birth Rights:
Custody v. Culture, USA TODAY, Oct. 15, 1995, at A4. After the Rosts lost in the California trial court,
they contacted their representative in the House of Representatives, the Honorable Deborah Pryce,
who seized the issue and proposed several bills to amend ICWA and exclude from its coverage those
children who were not members of a tribe at the time the child custody proceedings commenced in
state court. After the California appellate court-ruled ICWA unconstitutional in certain situations,
Pryce proposed a bill, which eventually became Title III of the Adoption Assistance and Stability Act,
which would have codified the California appellate court's decision with one major exception.
Whereas the California appeals court in Bridget R. seemed to imply that ICWA was unconstitutional
when applied to a child who was not a member of a tribe but who was eligible to become a member
and whose natural parents did not have substantial contacts with the tribe, the proposed bill would have
excluded ICWA coverage for any Indian child, member or not, whose parents did not have sufficient
political, cultural or economic ties to the Tribe. The significance of this distinction was apparently lost
upon Representative Pryce. Ironically, another California appeals court decision essentially adopted
the proposed amendment when it later held that ICWA was unconstitutional regardless of a child being
a member. Title III passed the House, but was killed by the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs. In
retrospect, it appears that the whole dispute could have been avoided had the adoption attorney not
advised the father to conceal his Indian heritage when consenting to the adoption by the Rosts. See'A
Bill to Amend the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, S. 1962, 104th Cong. (1996).
90. After Title III of the Adoption Promotion and Stability Act was killed by the Senate Com-
mittee on Indian Affairs, several tribal leaders and private adoption attorneys got together at the
urging of Senator John McCain from Arizona and the National Congress of American Indians to work
out their differences on ICWA. The result was a bipartisan bill to amend the act to give tribes, inter
alia, deadlines to intervene and object to voluntary adoption proceedings and rules to vest tribes with
the right to notice in voluntary proceedings. The resolution was submitted by Senator McCain and
passed the Senate. 142 CONG. REc. S11455, S11456 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1996). Later, Senator McCain
added a provision which would have explicitly rejected the existing Indian family exception. See S.
REP. No. 104-335 (1996), available in 1996 WL 546714. However, the congressional term ended
before the House had the opportunity to address the bill. Similar bills are now pending before the
105th Congress.
91. 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507 (Ct. App. 1996).
92. See In re Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. at 515. Apparently, the consents were not executed in
conformance with 25 U.S.C. § 1913(a). Id.
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withdraw his consent and regain custody of the children. 93 The court of
appeals reversed a lower court decision invalidating the relinquishment
and placing the twins with their paternal grandparents, and remanded to
the trial court for a determination of whether the parents had significant
"social, cultural or political relationships" with the tribe.94  This exami-
nation was necessary, according to the appellate court, to preserve the
constitutionality of the Indian Child Welfare Act. The Bridget R. court
held that the application of the Indian Child Welfare Act to the facts
therein would violate the substantive due process rights of Indian chil-
dren, 95 the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause, 96 and the
Tenth Amendment in cases where neither parent has substantial contacts
with a tribe.97 In an attempt to comport its decision with Holyfield, the
court held that whether the Indian child, (as opposed to an Indian
parent) in question has ties to the tribe is irrelevant because Holyfield had
rejected a similar line of argument, and that an Indian child who never
resided with a "real" Indian family was not being removed from an
existing Indian family. 98 Although this decision is limited to voluntary
placements by "unreal Indians," nothing in the language of the
93. It was later discovered that the natural father had originally sought to reveal his Indian
ancestry but was counselled not to do so by the adoption attorney for the putative adoptive parents.
See S. 1962.
94. See Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 537.
95. See id. at 526.
96. See id. at 528. The Court's reasoning on the equal protection claim appears to be as follows:
since most tribes determine membership by some genetic factors, such as descendancy from a tribal
member, these determinations are inherently racial in nature. 1d. Therefore, unless there is more than
a genetic connection to a tribe, i.e., the significant cultural, social, or political ties test, the application
of ICWA is unconstitutional. Id.
97. Id. at 528-29. The court held that the Indian Commerce Clause only permits Congress to
instruct state courts to apply federal law to Indians, as defined by the relevant tribe, if that person
maintains some political, social, or cultural ties to that tribe. Id. Otherwise, according to the Bridget R.
court, states are being instructed to apply a different set of laws to persons who are not real Indians
because they do not maintain the sufficient tribal contacts.
98. Id. at 522. The court indicated that under Holyfield, the Supreme Court implicitly rejected the
notion that the existing Indian family exception should apply when an Indian child who has never
resided with Indian family members is involved in a child custody proceeding. Id. Instead, the court
suggested that the real inquiry should be whether the natural parents have significant social, political
or cultural ties with the Tribe. Id. The court seemed to be implying that even in cases where an Indian
parent has had no contact with the child, as long as the parent maintains significant ties to the Tribe,
the child would be considered Indian. Id. This, of course, is a corruption of the original purpose cited
by the courts that adopted the exception which looked to the contacts the child had with an Indian
family.
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decision would apparently restrict its reasoning to the involuntary
removal of Indian children from "unreal Indians." 99
What is more, the Bridget R. court had the judicial gumption to
pronounce in its ruling what its predecessors insinuated but did not
directly say: certain state courts believe that the Indian Child Welfare
Act is being applied to children and parents who are not "real" Indians
and that, irrespective of whether an Indian tribe declares a person a mem-
ber, a state court should be able to second guess that determination and
weed out the "real" from the "counterfeit" Indians.100 As the court
exclaimed, "the unique values of Indian culture will not be preserved in
the homes of parents who have become fully assimilated into non-Indian
culture."101 Thus, according to Bridget R., assimilated Indians are not
real Indians and ICWA has no applicability to such persons who should
be solely governed by state law. 102
Although the Bridget R. court deserves high marks for its brazen-
ness, its logic is highly strained. 103 The decision typifies the Anglo-
dominated value judgments utilized by state courts which compelled
Congress to enact ICWA: "The states, exercising their recognized juris-
diction over Indian child custody proceedings through administrative
and judicial bodies, have often failed to recognize the essential tribal
relations of Indian people and the cultural and social standards
99. The court reasoned that ICWA's purpose is not served by an application of the Act where
the child may be of Indian descent but neither the child nor either parent maintains any significant
social, cultural, or political relationships with Indian life. Id. at 529. This suggests that even in a case
where a child is being involuntarily stripped from Indian parents, ICWA need not be applied unless the
parents are "real Indians." Such a result is an even more alarming possible extension of the analysis
because in many of the cases where Indian children are being removed involuntarily from their
parents, the reasons cited are typically behavior that is most antithetical to traditional native practices.
Could those reasons, however, now be utilized by the state to argue that a person is not truly an Indian
because his or her behavior is uncharacteristic of the Indian culture?
100. Such a pronouncement of state authority in this arena could arguably also be extended to
allowing state courts to exercise jurisdiction over criminal offenses committed by assimilated Indians
in Indian country; exercise civil jurisdiction over torts committed by assimilated Indians in Indian
country; deny assimilated Indians preference under various federal statutes including Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1994); deny assimilated Indians the right to exercise
tribal treaty rights; and the list goes on. All of these statutes are founded upon the political status of
tribal affiliation, thus if the affiliation is solely due to racial heritage, according to the Bridget R. court,
such distinctions are unconstitutional. See Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 528.
101. Id. at 526.
102. Of course, such a gloss given to ICWA would require, in every case where an Indian child
as defined by the Act is involved, a state court to make a determination that the significant political,
social or cultural ties test is met.. Such a determination would be needed for the proceedings to go
forward, which will undoubtedly result in significant delays while this issue is adjudicated.
103. The Bridget R. court restricts its analysis to off-reservation domiciled children, possibly to
distinguish its ruling from Holyfield. However, California is a Public Law 280 state, which means state
courts can even exercise jurisdiction over reservation-domiciled children. See 25 U.S.C. § 1911 (a)
(1994) (precluding state court jurisdiction except where federal law vests state courts with juris-
diction); see also infra note 234, (discussing Public Law 280). It is therefore unclear why the decision
is restricted to off-reservation children.
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prevailing in Indian communities and families."104 Apparently, the
Bridget R. court believed that while a state court may not be able to
appreciate tribal relations, it is well-suited to determine when such tribal
relations do not exist based upon an amorphous notion that Indian
people must maintain some political, cultural, or social ties with their
tribe to be truly Indian. 105 The court seemed to believe that such a
standard is constitutionally required in all cases or ICWA would be
based solely upon "genetic heritage," or race, and would thus be
unconstitutional. 106
The biggest difficulty with the Bridget R. standard is its subjectivity
and susceptibility to both abuse by, and abuse of, state courts. 10 7 Is an
Indian grandmother who has reared two generations of Indian children
in Los Angeles County in a manner similar to how her Indian grand-
mother raised her any less Indian than an Indian activist who tours the
country pontificating to non-Indians what it means to be Indian?108
Inviting state courts into this fray is no less damaging than allowing state
courts to judge Indian families based upon the court's own subjective
notions of what constitutes "normal" family life. 109 How could state
court judges, who Congress found lacking in concrete knowledge of
traditional Indian customs and traditions, discern which Indian families
were culturally attuned and which were assimilated? When would an
104. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(5) (1994) (emphasis added).
105. This standard should be juxtaposed with the policy of the government in the 1950s to re-
locate Indians to urban areas away from reservations for the express purpose of assimilating them into
urban life. See COHEN, supra note 21, at 169-170. The result was that many Indians migrated to the
urban areas at the promise of employment opportunities. Id.
106. See Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 528. The court cited to a few considerations it thought
relevant in determining whether the parents of an Indian child maintain significant ties to a tribe. See
id. at 531. They include whether they:
participated in tribal community activities, voted in tribal elections, or otherwise took an
interest in tribal politics, contributed to tribal or Indian charities, subscribed to tribal
newsletters, or other special periodicals of special interest to Indians, participated in
Indian religious, social, cultural or political events which are held in their own locality, or
maintained other social contacts with other members of the Tribe.
Id. at 531.
107. When the Bridget R. standard was incorporated into legislative action in the form of Title III
of the Adoption Promotion and Stability Act, at least one state's attorney general (Nevada) objected to
creating a standard for the definition of an Indian child which would require a state court judge to
make the difficult determination of whether an Indian child is really "Indian" every time ICWA may
be applicable. Letter from Frankie Sue Del Papa, Attorney General, Nevada, to Newt Gingrich,
Representative (May 6, 1996) (on file with the author). In addition, Title III added the requirement of
a threshold finding that the child involved had some degree of Indian heritage. This potentially could
have expanded the pool of children to whom the Act would have applied, thus requiring notice to any
tribe which a child may have had any affiliation with.
108. See RUSSELL MEANS, WHERE WHrrE MEN FEAR TO TREAD: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF RUSSELL
MEANS (1995).
109. Kafka would have been proud of the predicament the Bridget R. decision creates in
California for Indian families. Before the passage of ICWA, they were discriminated against because
they were not assimilated enough. Now, they are being denied the protections of federal law because
they over-assimilated.
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Indian tribe have to be notified of a proceeding involving one of its
members-before the determination by the state court judge that the
case involved a "real" Indian family or after? Would Indian children
who were raised in non-Indian homes always be considered assimilated
Indians when they grew up to be parents themselves?' 10 In short, Bridget
R. adopted, part and parcel, a stereotype of Indian people which many
non-Indians continue to possess as a way of defeating a federal law. I I I
Another California Court of Appeals believed the Bridget R. deci-
sion was actually too limiting and that state courts should be able to
determine, on a case by case basis, the amount of contacts both the child
and parents have had with their tribe and determine the applicability of
the act based upon a standard similar to the "totality of the circum-
stances."11 2 Thus, according to the court in Alexandria Y., even if the
Indian parent has substantial contacts with the tribe, the state court
should nonetheless look to determine whether that parent has imparted
those "political, cultural or social" ties to the child and if not, the child
should not be considered Indian."l 3 The Alexandria court coalesced the
two different theories of the existing Indian family exception into a one
size fits all abstract logic: the Baby Boy L. exception, which looks to the
amount of contacts the Indian parent has had with the child and deems it
irrelevant the parent's tribal affiliations, and the Crews exception, which
looks to whether the parent who did have contact is really an Indian. 114
The result is, at least in certain districts in California, that if an Indian
child has not lived with an Indian family, or has lived with an Indian
family that is assimilated, ICWA will not apply in either voluntary or
involuntary proceedings.
110. Several of the California decisions before Bridget R. involved Indian parents who grew up
in non-Indian homes and, not surprisingly, expressed an aversion for the Indian lifestyle. See, e.g., In
re Baby Girl A., 282 Cal. Rptr. 105, 110 (Ct. App. 1993) (involving an Indian mother raised by
non-Indians who expressed a preference to place the child with non-Indians and requested no tribal
involvement).
111. See FERGUS BORDEWICH, KILLING THE WHITE MAN'S INDIAN: REINVENTING NATIVE AMERICANS
AT THE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1996) (describing the phenomenon and how it impacts policy
toward native people).
112. In re Alexandria Y., 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 679, 686 (Ct. App. 1996). This case actually was com-
menced as an involuntary proceeding, therefore extending the Bridget R. analysis to cases where
Indian parents are having their children removed against their will. Id. at 681.
113. Id. at 687. It is interesting to note that this was the third time the California Court of Appeals
heard an appeal from this case. The first time the appellate court entered a writ of mandamus
directing the trial court to apply ICWA based upon the assertion by the Seminole Nation that the child
involved was a member. The court held, however, that that ruling was not dispositive on the issue of
whether ICWA applied because the existing Indian family exception had not been raised in that
appeal. Id. at 681.
114. See id. at 685. There have been two other California appellate courts which have rejected
the existing Indian family exception recognized in Baby Boy L. See In re Lindsay C., 280 Cal. Rptr.
194, 201 (Ct. App. 1991); In re Junious M., 193 Cal. Rptr. 40, 46 (Ct. App. 1983). The Bridget R. court
purported to reconcile its decision with these cases on the grounds that those courts failed to delve into
the ties of the Indian parents to their tribe. Id. at 686 n.8.
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4. The Indian Home Exception and Evidentiary Exceptions
Two other variations of the existing Indian family exception need to
be discussed before examining court decisions that have rejected the
doctrine. At least four state courts have adopted a limited existing Indi-
an family exception that holds that even though the Indian Child Welfare
Act may apply to a particular proceeding, a party advocating for a foster
care placement or termination of parental rights over an Indian child
need not produce qualified expert witnesses when the removal or
termination is not based upon culturally biased factors. 115 Under this
line of reasoning, a state court need not hear from a party with knowl-
edge of Indian child-rearing practices if the alleged ground for removal
of the child does not pertain to traditional child-rearing practices."l 6 Of
course, it is difficult to comprehend a party asking for the removal of an
Indian child on the ground that the child is being raised in a traditional
way contrary to non-Indian practices. However, that seems to be the
logic of these cases.117
The Kentucky Supreme Court, certainly not a bellwether of Indian
law, added its voice to this simmering debate by adopting yet another
version of the existing Indian family exception. The Kentucky excep-
tion focuses on the role Indian parents play in bringing up a child and
ignores the role of all other Indian family members."i8 In Rye v. Weasel,
for example, an Indian child was placed with her Indian uncle and his
non-Indian wife after the natural mother was unable to care for the child,
by a tribal court which retained exclusive jurisdiction over the child.
After the uncle and wife separated, the wife petitioned a Kentucky court
for custody of the child. The Tribe and uncle claimed that the tribal
court retained exclusive jurisdiction because the child was a ward of the
tribal court. 119 On appeal, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that the
Indian Child Welfare Act was inapplicable because the child had, with the
exception of the first nine months of her life, not lived in an Indian
home.120 The court completely ignored the fact that the child lived
115. See Long v. State Dep't Human Serv., 527 So. 2d 133, 136 (Ala. Civ. App. 1988); In re
N.L., 754 P.2d 863, 867 (Okla. 1988); Children's Serv. v. Campbell, 857 P.2d 888, 889 (Or. Ct. App.
1993); Juvenile Dep't v. Tucker, 710 P.2d 793, 799 (Or. Ct. App. 1985).
116. This is similar to the argument adopted by the Bridget R. court that unless an Indian child is
being removed from an un-assimilated Indian family ICWA should be inapplicable. See In re Bridget
R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507, 531 (Ct. App. 1996).
117. To these courts' credit, they do apply the majority of the requirements of ICWA even
though they hold that the families involved therein are not being culturally discriminated against.
118. Rye v. Weasel, 934 S.W.2d 257, 263 (Ky. 1996).
119. See id. at 259; see also 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) (1994) (giving tribal courts exclusive jurisdiction
over Indian children made wards of tribal courts); In re Parental Placement of M.R.D.B., 787 P.2d
1219, 1223 (Mont. 1990).
120. Rye, 934 S.W.2d at 260.
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almost her entire life with her Indian uncle, an "Indian custodian"
under the Act entitled to be treated in all legal respects as the parent of
the child.121 To further bolster its astonishing contention that ICWA was
inapposite, the court noted that the child "ha[d] grown up in a non-
Indian environment involving public schools and religious faith as well
as complete integration in the community. She does not speak the Sioux
language and does not practice its religion or customs." 122 Interest-
ingly, the Kentucky Supreme Court relied heavily on the Oklahoma
Supreme Court's decision in S.C. and reasoned that since Oklahoma has
a substantial population of Indians, the exception must be doctrinally
sound. 123 Apparently unbeknownst to the Kentucky Supreme Court, the
Oklahoma legislature repealed the exception in 1995 through
amendment of the state Indian Child Welfare Act.124
The Kentucky decision demonstrates how far the exception may
creep jurisdictionally. Weasel was the first time a state court applied the
exception to defeat a tribal court's exclusive jurisdiction. This may
foreshadow state courts exercising jurisdiction over Indian children
located on the reservation, whom the state courts have determined are not
really Indians, in contravention of ICWA, 125 as well as its federal
predecessors. 12 6
5. Cases Rejecting the Existing Indian Family Exception
It is interesting to note that the Kentucky Supreme Court dismissed
with only a vague reference, several state court decisions which had
rejected the exception, explaining them away as fact-specific cases which
had no bearing on the issues confronting the Kentucky court.127 In fact,
121. See 25 U.S.C. § 1903 (1994). Under ICWA an "Indian custodian" is defined as an Indian
person who has been granted legal custody of an Indian child under tribal or state law or a person to
whom the parent has vested custody. See § 1903(6). If a person is determined to be an Indian
cusiodian under ICWA that person is entitled to exercise the same rights as a parent under ICWA,
except that person cannot veto a transfer of jurisdiction back to the tribal court. Bestowing the status of
Indian custodian upon an Indian person is Congress's attempt to make state courts cognizant of the
fact that in many Indian families children are raised not by their parents, but by extended family
members. See, e.g., Donna Goldsmith, Individual vs. Collective Rights: The Indian Child Welfare Act,
13 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 6 (1990).
122. Rye, 934 S.W.2d at 264.
123. Id. at 261-62.
124. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 40.3 (West Supp. 1997). The Kentucky Supreme Court also
paid substantial attention to the fact that the existing Indian family exception was the subject of a
repeal effort by Congress in 1987 and 1988 and reasoned that since this effort was unsuccessful,
Congress intended the exception to exist. However, many persons assumed after the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Holyfield that the exception had been repudiated. In addition, it is
difficult to understand why the analysis of the Oklahoma courts adopting the existing Indian family
exception was of great precedential value when the state legislature there had repealed the exception.
125. See 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) (1994).
126. See Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 389 (1976) (holding that state courts have no
subject matter jurisdiction to grant adoption of a reservation-domiciled child).
127. See Rye, 934 S.W 2d at 261.
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it is unfair to leave the reader with the impression that the majority of
state courts have concocted this judicially created exception to defeat the
interests of Indian tribes and children. Many state courts have rejected
the existing Indian family exception as being contrary to the plain
language of the statute itself.128 One of the most thoughtful decisions
rejecting the exception is the Illinois Court of Appeal's decision in In re
Adoption of S.S. 129 This case involved an Indian child who had lived
most of his life with a non-Indian father, who died of AIDS, leaving the
natural mother, who resided in Indian country, with an apparent right to
custody.130 The Illinois Court of Appeals thoroughly analyzed the deci-
sions adopting the exception and the policy statements made in support
of the exception and ultimately found the analysis wanting.131 Specific-
ally, the court noted that it is improper to examine the legislative history
behind a particular statute when the language of the statute is clear and
unambiguous. In addition, the court disagreed with the proposition that
applying the Act to cases where Indian children have not lived with Indi-
an family members violates the intent of Congress, noting that preserving
the bond between child and tribe was another goal of Congress when it
enacted ICWA. 132
The New Jersey Supreme Court in 1988,133 and the Montana
Supreme Court 134 in 1996 also rejected an exception to the operation of
ICWA when an Indian child has not lived with an Indian family. The
Montana Supreme Court decision is interesting because it is the first
court to directly address the constitutionality of ICWA in light of the two
California appellate court decisions limiting its application purportedly
to preserve its constitutionality. In a case involving a dispute between a
128. See In re Adoption of T.N.F., 781 P.2d 973 (Alaska 1989); In re Coconino County, 741 P.2d
1218 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989); In re Baby Boy Doe, 849 P.2d 925 (Idaho 1993); In re J.R.H., 358 N.W.2d
311 (Iowa 1984); In re Elliott, 554 N.W.2d 32 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996); In re T.J.J., 366 N.W.2d 651
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985); In re Adoption of Riffle, 922 P.2d 510 (Mont. 1996); In re Adoption of Child of
Indian Heritage, 543 A.2d 925 (N.J. 1988); In re Oscar C. Jr., 559 N.Y.S. 531 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1990);
Quinn v. Walters, 845 P.2d 206 (Or. Ct. App. 1993); In re Baade, 462 N.W.2d 485 (S.D. 1990); In re
DAC, 933 P.2d 993 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); see also, Toni Hahn Davis, The Existing Indian Family
Exception to the Indian Child Welfare Act, 69 N.D. L. REV. 465 (1993).
129. 622 N.E.2d 832 (I11. App. Ct. 1993).
130. See In re Adoption of S.S., 622 N.E.2d 832, 834 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993). The Illinois Supreme
Court subsequently rejected the appellate court's holding that when a custodial parent dies the
domicile of the child automatically reverts to the domicile of the non-custodial parent. In re S.S., 637
N.E.2d 935, 936 (111. 1995).
131. S.S., 622 N.E.2d at 838.
132. Id. at 840. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's decision that the Fort
Peck tribal court had exclusive jurisdiction over the child, but with the exception of one concurring
opinion, the existing Indian family exception was not mentioned. See In re S.S., 637 N.E.2d 935 (I11.
1995). This case garnered some media attention because of the fact that the natural mother in this
matter died shortly after the Illinois Supreme Court decision. Ted Gregory, Sioux Tribe Keeps Custody
Fight Alive, CHI. TmiB., Dec. 27, 1995, at 1, available in 1996 WL 2636944.
133. In re Adoption of Baby Child, 543 A.2d 925 (N.J. 1988).
134. In re Adoption of Riffle, 922 P.2d 510 (Mont. 1996); see also In re DAC, 933 P.2d 993 (Utah
Ct. App. 1997).
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non-Indian couple and an Indian uncle over the rights to adopt the
Indian child, the court gave short shrift to the non-Indian couple's
argument that applying the placement preference provisions of ICWA to
an Indian child who allegedly had lived most of her life with the
non-Indian couple would violate the substantive due process rights of the
child. The Indian uncle successfully relied on the Supreme Court
decision in Holyfield, stressing that the Indian Child Welfare Act seeks to
preserve not only the cultural integrity of Indian children, but also the
cohesiveness of Indian tribes by maintaining a bond between tribe and
child. 135
Numerous other state courts have expressly rejected the application
of the existing Indian family exception. 136 However, if Congress sought
uniformity in the application of this federal statute, as the Supreme Court
implied in Holyfield, that objective is being frustrated by state courts
which continue to insist that the Act should not apply to certain Indian
children. Even among the states which have adopted the exception there
is no uniformity. Certain states look to whether the Indian child has
resided for a substantial period of time with Indian family members;137
others look exclusively to whether the child resided with an Indian
parent.138 Some states look to whether the Indian parents with whom the
child has resided, or would reside if returned, have substantial ties to the
tribe of affiliation. 139 Still others look to the nature of the allegations in
a removal petition to determine if those issues are susceptible to cultural
abuse. Finally, some states apply state laws to determine the "race" of
the child in the face of federal law which dictates that determination. 140
6. Implications of the Existing Indian Family Exception
Why is the continued expansion of the existing Indian family
exception by state courts noteworthy in our federalist scheme? It is not
only that these decisions appear to circumvent the intent of Congress to
ameliorate the almost 100 year history of the displacement of Indian
135. Id. at 514.
136. See In re Adoption of T.N.F., 781 P.2d 973 (Alaska 1989); In re Coconino County, 741 P.2d
1218 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989); In re Baby Boy Doe, 849 P.2d 925 (Idaho 1993); In re J.R.H., 358 N.W.2d
311 (Iowa 1984); In re Elliott, 554 N.W.2d 32 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996); In re T.J.J., 366 N.W.2d 651
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985); In re Adoption of Riffle, 922 P.2d 510 (Mont. 1996); In re Adoption of Child of
Indian Heritage, 543 A.2d 925 (N.J. 1988); In re Oscar C. Jr., 559 N.Y.S. 531 (Fain. Ct. 1990); Quinn
v. Waiters, 845 P.2d 206 (Or. Ct. App. 1993); In re Baade, 462 N.W.2d 485 (S.D. 1990).
137. See S.A. v. E.J.P., 571 So. 2d 1187 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990); In re Adoption of T.R.M., 525
N.E.2d 298 (Ind. 1988); In re Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168 (Kan. 1982); In re S.C., 833 A.2d 1249
(Okla. 1992).
138. Rye v. Weasel, 934 S.W.2d 257, 263-64 (Ky. 1996).
139. In re Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507 (Ct. App. 1996); In re Crews, 825 P.2d 305 (Wash.
1992).
140. Barbry v. Dauzat, 576 So. 2d 1013, 1021-22 (La. Ct. App. 1991).
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children, but more importantly, these courts seem to engage in redrafting
federal legislation with federal impunity. Louisiana can apply a
pre-slavery civil code to defeat the application of federal law and Cali-
fornia courts can redefine "Indian" in a manner that renders the
majority of non-reservation domiciled Indians "counterfeit" Indians.
Meanwhile, Indian tribes who are wards of the federal government and
are legalistically entitled to the protection of the federal government
from the abuses of state entities, 141 must sit idly by and see their children
perhaps permanently distanced from any contact with the tribe.
Unlike most federal statutes governing the protection of children,
ICWA has no federal financial linchpin and therefore the federal govern-
ment cannot use the threat of withheld federal dollars as leverage to
ensure compliance. 142 This makes the potential availability of a federal
court remedy even more pressing in these cases. Most importantly is the
appearance to both Indian tribes and states that the Indian Child Welfare
Act is primarily a state court issue which the federal courts have no role
to play in implementing. Such a grant of exclusive authority to a state
entity is oftentimes alarming to Indian tribes as it has often served as a
precursor to a diminution of sovereignty.1 43 A federal remedy is a sine
qua non to effective enforcement of ICWA.
II. USING THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD STANDARD TO
DENY TRANSFERS
Another area of wildly disparate rulings with regard to the appli-
cation of the Indian Child Welfare Act concerns the application of 25
U.S.C. § 1911(b), the transfer of jurisdiction over a child custody pro-
ceeding to tribal court. Section 1911(b) is intended to be a purely
141. It has been recognized that the United States government has an obligation o protect the
"assets" of Indian tribes against the excesses of state government. See, e.g., Arizona v. California,
376 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1964) (discussing the intervention of the United States in a suit involving two
states disputing water rights where the government had failed to adequately represent the tribes'
interest resulting in a finding of a breach of trust responsibility). It is not a far stretch to extend the
trust responsibility to the protection of a tribe's "most vital resource," its children. See 25 U.S.C. §
1901(3) (1994).
142. States receive billions of federal dollars to implement child welfare programs such as Title
IV-E of the Social Security Act in their state courts. 42 U.S.C. § 670 (1994). Many of these contain
requirements allowing the federal government to sanction states that fail to comply with federal
mandates. However, until 1995 there was no possibility of a federal sanction for a state or state court
that failed to admonish the directives of ICWA. That has changed slightly with an amendment to Title
IV-B of the Social Security Act in 1995 requiring compliance with ICWA and joint coordination with
Indian tribes in implementing family preservation programs. See Social Security Amendments Act of
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-432, 108 Stat. 4398 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 620 (1994)).
143. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1994); 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321 - 1326 (1994); 28 U.S.C. § 1360
(1994). Section 1162, often referred to as Public Law 280, gave certain state courts jurisdiction over
civil causes of action and criminal matters arising within Indian country and gave other states the
option to exercise that jurisdiction. The law was condemned by Indian leaders who saw the vesting of
states with any authority over Indian country as an unwarranted intrusion into their sovereign powers.
See SEC. INT. REP. 273 (1954).
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procedural section which requires a state court to transfer jurisdiction
over foster care or termination of parental rights proceedings from state
court to tribal court absent objection by either parent or the finding of
"good cause" to deny the transfer. Good cause is not defined under
the statute, but is somewhat fleshed out in the BIA Guidelines for state
courts which, although not federal regulations, have been followed by
many state courts. 144
The transfer provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act, referred to
by the United States Supreme Court as the "presumptive jurisdictional"
provisions, 4 5 were designed to maximize tribal decision-making authori-
ty over Indian children and their placements by presuming in most
circumstances that a tribal court judge would be in a better position to
decide a case involving an Indian. This right of the tribe to determine
the fate of Indian children is balanced against the paramount right of the
parents to overrule a transfer of jurisdiction by objecting. Once a parent
objects, transfer cannot take place notwithstanding the apparent merits of
a transfer. 146
"Transfer" under the Act does not refer to a physical transfer of
custody of an Indian child, but merely a legal transfer of the authority to
make decisions regarding the placement of said child. So, for example,
nothing in the Act prohibits, and this happens frequently, a tribal court
from gaining jurisdiction over a proceeding but then not altering
placement, so that the child involved remains in the identical placement
the child was in immediately preceding transfer, which may even be the
custody of a state agency.' 4 7 Additionally, once jurisdiction is trans-
ferred back to the tribal court, the Indian Child Welfare Act ceases to
apply unless the relevant tribal court has incorporated the provisions of
that law into its code or ordinances. Therefore, transfer of a case back to
a tribal court neither defeats the rights of a person arguing for a place-
ment of an Indian child, nor does it foreshadow any decision regarding
the placement of an Indian child.148
State court judges have been indoctrinated, however, to believe that
every decision they make in a proceeding involving a child must be
144. See State Courts-Indian Child Custody Proceedings; Final Guidelines, 44 Fed. Reg. 67584
(1979).
145. Mississippi Band Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 36 (1989).
146. See In re Maricopa County, 922 P.2d 319, 323 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996)(stating that even though
the natural mother of the child was schizophrenic and the guardian ad litem consented to transfer, the
court erred in transferring the case to tribal court over the mother's objections).
147. See B.J. JoNEs, INDiAN CnED WELFARE Acr HANDBOOK 35 (1995).
148. This was proven by two very well publicized cases where, after long and arduous litigation
undertaken by non-Indian couples to keep child custody proceedings involving children they were
wishing to adopt out of tribal court, the couples were permitted by the tribal court to retain physical
custody of the children. See Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 53-54; In re Adoption of Halloway, 732 P.2d 962
(Utah 1986).
1997] 423
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
done in the best interest of that child, and view proceedings involving
Indian children no differently. Despite this standard practice, the Indian
Child Welfare Act conspicuously omits reference to this term of standard
parlance frequently used in child welfare decisions: the best interest of
the child. 149 In only two sections of the Act is the magical term best
interest of the child utilized; in the congressional declaration of
policy,1 50 and in a section regarding the setting aside of an adoption of
an Indian child.151 Several courts have opined that a proper implemen-
tation of the Act serves the best interest of the Indian child because it
makes it extremely difficult for a state court to approve of an action or
placement which -tears the child asunder from the tribe and the child's
extended tribal family.15 2
The question remains as to whether the best interest of the child
standard should govern a decision to transfer jurisdiction over a child
custody proceeding to a tribal court. At first blush, one might respond
in the affirmative because of the perception that changing a child's
environment will obviously cause an impact on that child. After further
insight, it is apparent that the decision to transfer jurisdiction really has
no impact upon the child, except to.optimally permit a tribal judge, who
would have more perspicacity into the needs of Indian children, to make
decisions concerning the children's futures.153 Transfer only relays the
authority to render the decision as to the best interest of the child from
one court to another, and does not ordain what that decision will be. To
assume otherwise would be to conjecture that a tribal court will not act in
a child's best interest.
Some state courts have readily sanctioned the notion, however, that
they should be able to decide before transfer whether they believe the
tribal court will act in the best interest of the child after transfer by claim-
ing that a transfer of jurisdiction can be denied on the basis that such a
transfer would not be in the best interest of the child.154 This theory, as
espoused by several state courts, allows state court judges to deny trans-
149. The origins of this frequently invoked nomenclature in proceedings involving children may
be the Goldstein, Freud and Solnit book. GOLDSTEIN ET. AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD
(1973).
150. 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (1994).
151. 25 U.S.C. § 1916(a) (1994).
152. The legislative history actually reveals that Congress believed that a proper implementation
of the Act itself would be in the "best interest of an Indian child." See H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, at 19
(1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530.
153. Yavapai Apache Tribe v. Mejia, 906 S.W.2d 152, 169 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995). This case
contains an excellent discussion of utilizing the best interests standard to deny transfers and why it
seems inconsistent with the intent of Congress. Id.
154. Courts that have embraced this reasoning include Montana, South Dakota, South Carolina,
Nebraska, and Arizona. See In re Maricopa County, 828 P.2d 1245 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991); In re C.W.,
479 N.W.2d 105 (Neb. 1992); Department Soc. Serv. Bd. v. Coleman, 399 S.E.2d 773 (S.C. 1990); In
re T.S., 801 P.2d 77 (Mont. 1990); In re J.J., 454 N.W.2d 317 (S.D. 1990).
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fers to tribal courts if the state court judge does not fancy the planned
placement of a tribal court or does not approve of an anticipated action
of the tribal court.
Like the existing Indian family exception, the use of the best
interest of the child standard to deny transfers of jurisdiction back to
tribal courts is another example of state judicial exception-making that
does violence to the language of the statute itself in an attempt to craft
ICWA into something which state court judges feel comfortable apply-
ing. Frequently, this exception is invoked by state court judges to avoid
transferring jurisdiction over Indian children back to tribal courts when
Indian children have been placed (oftentimes in violation of the place-
ment preference provisions) with non-Indian foster or adoptive homes.
State courts strive to keep the children where they have bonded, especial-
ly when they are convinced that the tribal court will negate the place-
ment. 155 More often than not, in certain publicized cases where parties
have fought hard to defeat tribal court jurisdiction, this presumption has
proved erroneous. 156 Yet, this misgiving continues to be reflected in
many state court decisions.
For example, one of the first courts to adopt the argument was the
Oklahoma Supreme Court in Matter of N.L., 157 where the court upheld
the denial of a transfer petition based upon the fact that the child in
question was receiving good care under state wardship, had roots in the
area, and the state court was working toward reuniting the child with the
mother.158 Ergo, the court, apparently assuming that all these positives
in the child's life would end upon transfer, denied the request on the
ground that it would be contrary to the best interest of the child.
The N.L. court relied heavily upon the Montana Supreme Court's
decision in In the Interest of M.E.M. 159 where the Montana Supreme
Court remanded a termination of parental rights proceeding back to the
trial court for failure to appoint counsel for the Indian mother. 160 In so
doing, the court also addressed the mother's argument that the case
should have been transferred back to the Standing Rock Sioux Tribal
Court. The trial court had denied transfer primarily based upon the testi-
mony of a state social worker that she was opposed to transfer because
the Tribal court would not tell her what the future plans for the child
155. This appeared to be the case in the Montana decision in T.S., the South Dakota decision in
J.J., as well as the Nebraska decision in C. W., wherein the state courts were critical of the anticipated
tribal court placements of Indian children.
156. See, e.g., Mississippi Band Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989); In re Adoption
of Halloway, 732 P.2d 962 (Utah 1986).
157. 754 P.2d 863 (Okla. 1988).
158. See In re N.L., 754 P.2d 863, 869 (Okla. 1988).
159. 635 P.2d 1313 (Mont. 1981). Readers should be aware that there are numerous decisions
from the Montana Supreme Court with the same name.
160. In re M.E.M., 635 P.2d 1313, 1317 (Mont. 1981).
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were and because she believed that the Tribal court would allow the child
to be sexually molested. The Montana court, while not ruling that such
testimony constituted good cause, held that transfer can be denied based
upon a showing of clear and convincing evidence that transfer would be
contrary to the best interest of the child.16 1 Thus the Oklahoma court
was apparently persuaded that a trial court should be able to peer
beyond the issue of transfer and determine whether the tribal court's
putative placement decision will serve what is perceived to be the child's
best interest.
Montana explicitly adopted the best interest of the child standard as
the primary focus in determining transfer of jurisdiction issues in In re
T.S.162 The court held that it would be contrary to the best interest of an
Alaskan native child to remove her from her foster home in Montana
and to return her to her native home in Alaska because of the separation
trauma such a move would cause. 163 The court distinguished this best
interest of the child standard from the one typically utilized in depen-
dency and neglect proceedings and custody determinations, though the
legal impact of such a distinction is lacking.164
Other state courts have similarly questioned the putative decisions of
tribal courts on placement issues in deciding that transfer of jurisdiction
would be contrary to the best interest of an Indian child if it results in a
break-up of the present placement. 165 In In re Robert T.,166 a California
appeals court held that considering the child's best interests was an
appropriate consideration in denying a transfer request of the Santo
Domingo Pueblo Tribe, which aspired to place an Indian child with his
extended family members. The trial court held that placement with such
persons would be contrary to the child's best interest because the child
had bonded with the present non-Indian foster adoptive parents, who had
become his psychological parents, and that a move to the reservation
would cause the child irreparable harm. 167 The Robert T. court
appeared to be making a decision regarding altering the placement
preferences as a way of defeating a transfer request of the tribe,
161. Id.
162. 801 P.2d 77 (Mont. 1990), cert. denied sub nom. King Island Nation's Community v.
Montana Dept. Soc. Serv., 500 U.S. 917 (1991).
163. In re T.S., 801 P.2d 77, 81 (Mont. 1990).
164. See id. at 80. The court seemed to imply that even though the parlance was similar to that
used in a proceeding where a placement decision regarding a child was being looked at, the transfer
issue did not involve all the same issues. Id.
165. See, e.g., In re J.J., 454 N.W.2d 317, 331 (S.D. 1990) (questioning the wisdom of a
placement proffered by a tribe in support of a motion to transfer jurisdiction).
166. 246 Cal. Rptr. 2d 168 (Ct. App. 1988).
167. In re Robert T., 246 Cal. Rptr. 2d 168, 174-75 (Ct. App. 1988).
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obviously foreshadowing its intent not to comply with the law on
adoptive placement.168
Just as with the existing Indian family exception to ICWA, there is a
divergence of judicial viewpoints on whether the best interest of the child
standard should be utilized to disallow transfers of jurisdiction to tribal
courts. 169 The Illinois appellate court decision of In re ArmeIll 70 in-
volved a guardian ad litem's objection to a transfer of jurisdiction on the
ground that the best interest of the child was not considered by the trial
court. The court, relying upon Holyfield and Halloway, held that the
best interest of the child was a relevant consideration in determining
placement but was an illegitimate consideration in determining which
court should decide placement.171 The court also rejected the notion
that Illinois law required the court to look to the best interest of the child
standard in every decision the court made and held that Holyfield pro-
hibits the application of state law which would contribute to a lack of uni-
formity in the application of ICWA.172 Courts in Texas, 173 Colorado, 174
New Mexico,175 Utah,1 76 and Minnesota 177 have similarly rejected the
notion that a state court should be able to decide whether allowing a
tribal court to decide the fate of an Indian child is in that child's best
interest.
Interestingly enough, just as the United States Supreme Court in
Holyfield implicitly repudiated the viability of the existing Indian family
exception, much of its language also militates against the adoption of the
best interest of the child standard in deciding jurisdictional issues. In
response to an argument by the non-Indian adoptive parents in Holyfield
168. Id. In some of the cases where courts have denied transfer because it purportedly would be
contrary to the best interest of the child, the courts seemed convinced that the placement chosen by the
social services agency for the Indian child was in the child's best interest without even assessing
whether efforts were made to find a placement in accordance with ICWA. See In re Adoption of M.
v. Navajo Nation, 832 P.2d 518, 522 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992).
169. See Michael J. Dale, State Court Jurisdiction Under the Indian Child Welfare Act and the
Unstated Best Interest of the Child Standard, 27 GONZ. L. REV. 353, 370-75 (1992) (reviewing these
cases).
170. 550 N.E.2d 1060 (I11. App. Ct. 1990).
171. See In re Armell, 550 N.E.2d 1060, 1065 (111. App. Ct. 1990) (citing In re Halloway, 732
P.2d 962 (Utah 1986)). In Halloway, although the issue was the exclusive jurisdiction of the Navajo
tribal courts under § 191 l(a), the court in strong language indicated that psychological bonding
between a child and his foster parents was not a sufficient reason to deny a tribal court the exercise of
its appropriate jurisdiction. See In re Halloway, 732 P.2d 962, 971 (Utah 1986).
172. In re Armell, 550 N.E.2d at 1065-66.
173. See Yavapai-Apache Tribe v. Mejia, 906 S.W.2d 152 (Tex. App. 1995). The court there en-
gaged in a thorough analysis of the issue and concluded that considering the best interest of the child in
deciding a transfer issue "defeats the very purpose for which ICWA was enacted, in that it allows
Anglo Cultural biases into the analysis." Id. at 169. The court also stated that questions of best interest
were "appropriate to issues of placement," but not a transfer of jurisdiction. Id.
174. In re J.L.P., 870 P.2d 1252, 1258-59 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994).
175. In re Ashley Elizabeth R., 863 P.2d 451 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993).
176. See In re Halloway, 732 P.2d at 962.
177. In re B.W., 454 N.W.2d 437 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
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that a decision to vest the Choctaw tribal court with jurisdiction over the
twins would be tantamount to stripping them away from the only home
they had ever known, the Court rebuffed the suggestion that such a fear
was a relevant factor, holding: "Whatever feelings we might have as to
where the twins should live . . . it is not for us to decide that question.
We have been asked to decide the legal question of who should make the
custody determination regarding these children-not what that decision
should be. The law places that in the hands of the Choctaw court." 178
Once again, however, state courts have been remiss in getting this mes-
sage and the result is a cornucopia of conflicting decisions on another
key area of jurisdictional disputes under ICWA.
The peril associated with allowing state courts to utilize a best
interest of the child standard to determine a transfer issue is that it
borders on licensing state courts to question the competency of tribal
courts to decide the fate of Indian children, something expressly prohib-
ited by the BIA guidelines and obviously not condoned by Congress.179
If anything, Congress was questioning the competency of state courts to
decide these issues involving Indian children.180 Many of these state
court decisions, without overtly declaring it, surmise that the tribal court
will act contrary to the best interest of an Indian child. 181 Additionally,
as a Texas appellate court has noted, the best interest if the child is such a
subjective standard that it potentially may defeat transfer in almost every
case. 182 Using the best interest standard may portend the denial of a
majority of transfer motions, turning "presumptive" jurisdiction into
the exception rather than the rule.183
178. Mississippi Band Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 53 (1989). Even though Holy-
field involved a question of exclusive jurisdiction under § 191 1(a) and not transfer of jurisdiction, it is
apparent that the same analysis would apply to a transfer of jurisdiction as that only involves
considerations of who makes a decision about a child, not what decision should be made.
179. Guidelines for State Courts: Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed. Reg. 314, 321 (Dep't
Interior 1979) (proposed Nov. 26, 1979).
180. This is perhaps why the Supreme Court in Holyfield referred to a tribal court's jurisdiction
over Indian children domiciled off the reservation as its "presumptive jurisdiction." See Holyfield, 490
U.S. at 36.
181. See, e.g., In re J.J., 454 N.W.2d 317,,330 (S.D. 1990). The court insinuated that a grand-
mother of an Indian child was utilizing a tribal court to regain custody of her grandchild so that the
child could be sexually abused. Id.
182. See Yavapai-Apache Tribe v. Mejia, 906 S.W.2d 152, 169 n. Il (Tex. Ct. App. 1995) (citing
Jeanne Louise Carriere, Representing the Native American Child: Culture, Jurisdiction and the Indian
Child Welfare Act, 79 IOWA L. REV. 585, 615 (1994)).
183. One of the reasons, perhaps, that the best interest of the child standard is invoked in
opposition to transfer requests by tribes or Indian parents is that oftentimes the tribe or an advocate for
the tribe will reveal the placement choices the tribe has for a particular child. This leaves the putative
choice open to critical analysis by a state court or party opposing transfer. Tribes are under no obli-
gation under ICWA to reveal their plans with regard to the placement of a child after transfer. Nor
are tribes obliged to follow through with a placement that is put forward in a state court when a
transfer motion is heard. The danger, of course, with such an approach is that many tribes appear in
the same court system often and state court judges may have long memories when a particular tribe
re-appears in their court.
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Additionally, as one author has suggested, the use of this standard to
deny transfer allows the dominant non-Indian society to exercise
continued dominance over Indian child-rearing practices, in much the
same way that forcing Indian families to give up their children for
boarding schools did prior to the passage of ICWA.184 Tribal courts
may eventually be compelled to conform their placement decisions to
appease non-Indian judges, who often times have an archetype of a
family setting that best meets the needs of all children, just to facilitate
the exercise of their transfer jurisdiction.
For example, some states have a predisposition against the place-
ment of children in single-parent homes. This was cited by the Bureau
of Indian Affairs as a reason many state courts used to defeat the place-
ment of Indian children in Indian homes. 185 However, at least one court
has suggested that a state agency should review its policies regarding
placements of Indian children to reconcile them with the clear intent of
Congress not to judge Indian families with a non-Indian barometer.IS 6
Whereas the existing Indian family exception interferes with the
tribal prerogative to define its own membership, the increasing number
of certain state courts that deny transfers of child custody proceedings to
tribal courts using the best interest of the child also adversely impacts the
ability of tribes to decide the fate of their children. Both practices are
alarming enough to look to federal court intervention for correction.
III. FEDERAL COURT REVIEW OF STATE COURT ICWA
DECISIONS
If one accepts the premise that certain state courts are thwarting the
intent of Congress as to ICWA and that disparate decisions in these vital
areas do not serve the purpose of achieving a uniform federal applica-
tion of ICWA, the question becomes what role the federal courts should
play in enforcing both the intent of the law and in achieving nation wide
uniformity. Almost without exception, every federal statute designed to
protect the civil rights of an identifiable group against the vagaries of
state action is justiciable in federal court except when a state court has
184. See Jeanne Louise Carriere, Representing the Native American Child: Culture, Jurisdiction,
and the Indian Child Welfare Act, 79 IOWA L. REV. 585, 622 (1994).
185. Guidelines for State Courts: Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed. Reg. 314, 324 (Dep't
Interior 1979) (proposed Nov. 26, 1979). This states that "the legislative history (of ICWA) makes it
clear that Congress intended custody decisions to be made based on a consideration of the present or
potential custodian's ability to provide the necessary care, supervision and support for the child rather
than on preconceived notions of proper family composition."
186. See In re J.R.H., 358 N.W.2d 311, 322 (Iowa 1984). The Iowa Supreme Court criticized
the lower court's decision to deny a placement with an Indian mother because of socioeconomic
conditions on the Indian reservation. Id. The court stated that just as state courts should not act on
preconceived notions of what constitutes a good family life in deciding whether to remove an Indian
child, such standards should not be used as obstacles to deny placements with Indian families. Id.
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decided the issue after giving each party a fair opportunity to address the
matter. 187 ICWA is engaging though, because without directly saying it,
the statute shows a distrust of the competency and institutional capabili-
ty of state courts to handle proceedings involving Indian children. After
all, it was the state courts themselves that were the perceived violators of
the civil rights of Indian children and families when Congress finally
interceded and enacted ICWA to curtail the authority of those courts. 188
Did Congress postulate in ICWA that the mere act of passing legis-
lation restraining the limits of state court authority would remedy the
abuses of judicial dominion brought to its attention? Alternatively, did
Congress anticipate continued violations and provide a federal vehicle in
ICWA to overturn erroneous state court decisions? As this article will
demonstrate, most federal courts that have encountered attempts by
Indian parents and tribes to invalidate state court actions which arguably
do violence to the clear language and intent of Congress, have ruled that
ICWA was not intended to empower independent federal court scrutiny
of state court decisions. The result is that, notwithstanding Congress's
discerning focus on state courts as participants in the devastation of
Indian families and culture, those state courts continue to have almost
unfettered authority to superimpose their own precepts and cultural
cliches on Indian families and tribes. Was it Congress' intent to slam the
federal courthouse door shut on Indian families and tribes seeking to
fulfill the objectives of ICWA?
Congress conspicuously ruminated that there would be violations of
ICWA because throughout the statute there are provisions dictating
corrective actions to be taken by the courts. For example, 25 U.S.C. §
1913(d) allows any party to a child custody proceeding to withdraw a
consent to adoption and invalidate the adoption if the consent was
obtained through fraud or duress, provided the adoption has been in
effect less than two years.189 Additionally, another measure of the Act
requires a state court to decline an exercise of jurisdiction over any
action brought by a party which obtained custody of an Indian child in
187. Of course a well recognized exception to the rule permitting federal courts to exercise juris-
diction over civil rights actions against state officials is the federal full faith and credit clause con-
tained at 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994). Section 1738 requires federal courts to grant the same preclusive
effect to a state court judgment as the issuing state court would grant. This statute, unless Congress
intended otherwise, applies to an action brought under a federal civil rights statute. See Allen v.
McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 104 (1980).
188. The situation is somewhat similar to the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which called into question
the ability, indeed the willingness, of the state courts to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment and other
federal civil rights protections. See Robert J. Kaczorowski, Article: Revolutionary Constitutionalism in
the Era of the Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 863, 864 (1986).
189. 25 U.S.C. § 1913(d) (1994).
[VOL. 73:395.430
INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT
violation of the Indian Child Welfare Act, or who retained custody after a
demand for the return of custody by an Indian parent or custodian.190
A. SECTION 1914 OF ICWA
The broadest remedial scheme in ICWA, however, is found at §
1914191 which allows an
Indian child who is the subject of any action for foster care
placement or termination of parental rights under state law, any
parent or Indian custodian from whose custody such child was
removed, and the Indian child's tribe [to] petition any court of
competent jurisdiction to invalidate such action upon a showing
that such action violated any provision of sections 1911,192
1912193 or 1913 of this title. 194
The legislative history to this section states that it "authorizes the child,
parent or Indian custodian, or tribe to move to set aside any foster care
placement or termination of parental rights on the grounds that the
rights secured under sections [1911, 1912, or 1913] were violated."195
Unlike § 1913(d), § 1914 does not have a timeliness restriction for
challenging an action taken in contravention of ICWA. Nor is § 1914
securable to a party challenging a foster care or adoptive placement
done in violation of the Indian Child Welfare Act.196  A party could
indisputably collaterally challenge a state court's decision that ICWA
does not apply to a particular proceeding because of the existing Indian
family exception since such a decree would inevitably result in potential
violations of all three sections of ICWA which are subject to invalidation
190. 25 U.S.C. § 1920 (1994). This section was optimally designed to prevent a party from
illegally obtaining custody of a child, without following the requirements of § 1913, and then filing a
petition with the state court to involuntarily displace an Indian child after the natural parents seeks to
regain custody. The Indiana Supreme Court in In re Adoption of T.R.M., has held that this provision
does not prevent the state court from finding that an Indian mother abandoned her child after placing
the child with a couple shortly after birth, in violation of ICWA. In re Adoption of T.R.M., 525 N.E.2d
298 (1989).
191. 25 U.S.C. § 1914 (1994).
192. Section 1911 is the jurisdictional provision of ICWA vesting tribal courts with exclusive
jurisdiction over reservation-domiciled Indian children and providing for transfer of jurisdiction over
non-reservation domiciled children.
193. Section 1912 governs involuntary foster care and termination of parental rights proceedings
and requires notice to the Indian child's tribe, appointment of counsel for the parents or Indian
custodian of the Indian child, and delineates the necessary state court findings to justify a foster care
placement or termination of parental rights.
194. 25 U.S.C § 1914 (emphasis added). Section 1913 governs voluntary foster care placements
and consents to termination of parental rights and sets out the requirements before a voluntary
termination or placement will be honored. This section also allows an Indian parent or custodian to
withdraw consent and regain custody, and to challenge consents obtained through fraud or duress.
195. See H.R, REP. No. 95-1386, at 12 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7546.
196. See 25 U.S.C. § 1915 (1994) (governing those requirements).
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under § 1914.197 A party could also challenge a state court's decree not
to transfer jurisdiction over a proceeding to a tribal court based on the
best interest of the Indian child, as this is clearly covered by § 1911(b).
On its face, § 1914 seems to be the mechanism to ensure a fair and
uniform application of the Indian Child Welfare Act nation wide.
Section 1914 has proven to be a bust, however, insofar as permitting
federal court oversight of state court ICWA decisions. To date, no
federal court has invalidated an arguably erroneous state court decision
because the majority of federal courts have emasculated their authority
to do so under the principles of full faith and credit.198 Section 1914
has proven to be a toothless saber.
One inherent weakness in § 1914 is that Congress did not delineate
which court it believed would be a "court of competent jurisdiction"
when it enacted ICWA. In a search for the meaning of this term, an
examination of the legislative history proves fruitless. By the process of
elimination, one would assume that Congress must have intended to vest
the federal courts with the authority to review erroneous state court
decisions, because it is illogical to believe Congress intended that state
courts should be the courts of competent jurisdiction to determine
whether state courts applied the law correctly.199 This is especially true
since almost all states prohibit one branch of their court system from
collaterally challenging decisions of the other, but instead require that
appropriate appellate remedies be utilized.
197. If a state court adopts the existing Indian family exception, it will not apply any of the
provisions of § 1911, § 1912 or § 1913 of ICWA, thus denying an Indian tribe notice of a proceeding
and the right to intervene. It also denies an Indian custodian the right to court-appointed counsel, the
right of Indian parents or the tribe to transfer jurisdiction over a child to tribal court, or perhaps even
the fight of tribal courts to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over a child custody proceeding.
198. This is not to imply that no federal court has invalidated a policy of a state which is in
violation of ICWA. Some federal courts have rescinded state administrative actions which violate
ICWA, such as refusing to honor tribal court adoption decrees. See Native Village of Venetie I.R.A.
Council v. Alaska, 944 F.2d 548, 562 (9th Cir. 1991) (invalidating an Alaskan policy of denying full
faith and credit to Alaskan native village adoption decrees). These actions did not involve the validity
of a prior state court decision, something clearly existing in those court decisions adopting the existing
Indian family exception or the best interest of the child standard in denying transfers.
199. See, e.g., Slone v. Inyo County Juvenile Court, 282 Cal. Rptr. 126, 130 (Ct. App. 1991)
(rejecting an attempt by a litigant to invoke the jurisdiction of a California superior court, under § 1914
of ICWA, to invalidate an action taken by the juvenile court). The Slone court rejected the notion that
Congress had intended to supersede the California jurisdictional rules prohibiting one branch of the
state judicial system from reviewing decisions of another by enacting § 1914. See id. at 128. Section
1914 would not appear to be a viable remedy in the state courts of California. Id.
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Tribal courts are courts of competent jurisdiction to question state
action in certain circumstances, 200 but it is unlikely that Congress would
have intended to interpose tribal court authority to overrule state court
action through its enactment of ICWA. Congress clearly did not intend
to deprive state courts of their traditionally-exercised jurisdiction over
child custody actions arising outside of Indian country. 201 If Congress
had intended for tribal courts to exercise exclusive authority over all
Indian children, wherever located, § 1911(a) would have been extended
to apply to all Indian children. The fact that Congress provided for
concurrent transfer jurisdiction strongly manifests that a tribal court's
exercise of lawful jurisdiction, entitled to deference by other courts, is
contingent upon a legal transfer of jurisdiction over a non-reservation
domiciled child. Thus, it is dubious whether a tribal court could
invalidate an action of a state court absent the state court exceeding its
authority and violating § 1911(a). 202 Additionally, many tribal courts
do not exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction because of internal restraints
and would therefore not be accessible to review decisions of state courts
involving Indian children residing off the reservation. 203 Even if they
could, several state courts have indicated an aversion to deferring to
tribal court decisions on ICWA cases in the face of conflicting state court
decisions.
200. For example, if a state court were exercising jurisdiction over a reservation-domiciled child
or a ward of the tribal court in violation of ICWA, it be appropriate in light of § 191 1(a) for a tribal
court to enjoin that exercise of excessive jurisdiction or invalidate any court action taken. However,
the courts that have addressed this issue tend to side with the state and ignore the tribal court's ruling.
See, e.g., Comanche Indian Tribe v. Hovis, 53 F.3d 298, 304-05 (10th Cir. 1995) (reversing a lower
court decision enjoining the state court from continuing to exercise jurisdiction over an Indian child
and requiring the matter be transferred to tribal court on the grounds that the state court decision was
res judicata under 28 U.S.C. § 1738). In addition, some courts have held that tribal courts can exercise
jurisdiction over claims against state officials for actions taken on the reservation. See Nevada v.
Hicks, 944 F. Supp. 1455, 1462 (D. Nev. 1996) (recognizing the authority of a tribal court to
adjudicate a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against a state official for a wrongful seizure of a big-horn sheep
on the reservation).
201. See H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, at 12 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7541. Con-
gress opined that it is not their intent to strip state courts of their jurisdiction, but to impose substantive
requirements which they must implement. Id.
202. Already, as this article has demonstrated, some state courts have ignored the congressional
admonition in ICWA that tribes shall be the principal authority for determining tribal membership, and
instead have issued their own decisions regarding whether a child is truly an Indian under ICWA. It is
highly unlikely, therefore, that a state court would honor a tribal court decision invalidating an action
of a state court involving an off-reservation domiciled child. See, e.g., In re Adoption of T.R.M., 525
N.E.2d 298, 307 (Ind. 1988) (ignoring tribal court order declaring an Indian child a ward of tribal
court on the grounds that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction to enter such an order); In re Welfare of
R.I., 402 N.W.2d 173, 177 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); In re W.L., 859 P.2d 1019, 1021 (Mont. 1993).
Even if a tribal court took such action, it would probably have to look to a federal forum to enforce it,
and this option appears to be very dubious. See Comanche Indian Tribe v. Hovis, 53 F.3d 298 (10th
Cir. 1995).
203. See In re Defender, 435 N.W.2d 717, 721 (S.D. 1989) (refusing to honor tribal court judg-
ment giving custody of an Indian child to the father on the grounds that the tribal court exceeded its
jurisdiction under its own law).
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This leaves only the federal courts as "courts of competent jurisdic-
tion" under § 1914. However, federal courts are loath to infer federal
court jurisdiction from equivocal language in federal statutes, especially
ones that affect domestic relations, which are matters generally left to
state courts. 204 Section 1914, if it ipso facto intends to bestow jurisdic-
tion upon the federal courts to review state ICWA decisions, is not a
model of clarity.
Another shortcoming in the language of the statute, is its use of
discretionary, rather than precatory language. The section does not man-
date that a court of competent jurisdiction repair an erroneous state court
decision, but only vests that court with the discretion to do so. This is
exceedingly odd and unexplained in the legislative history. Perhaps Con-
gress used such language to permit a court of competent jurisdiction to
review the totality of the circumstances surrounding a particular child
(the amount of time in a particular placement, for example) before
choosing to vacate the decision of a state court. This appears to be the
only reasonable interpretation of such language, although it is perhaps
contravened by the fact that Congress explicitly allowed such consider-
ations in another section of ICWA dealing with adoptions which go awry
and methods for freeing Indian children from adoptive placements. 20 5
B. IMPACT OF FEDERAL FULL FAITH AND CREDIT STATUTE ON FEDERAL
ICWA CHALLENGES
However, the frailties of § 1914 have not proved as obstructionist to
parties seeking to attack state court decisions in federal court as the
federal full faith and credit statute. The statute, contained at 28 U.S.C. §
1738,206 requires that a federal court grant the same preclusive effect to a
state court decision as the state court would. This axiom of federalism,
combined with the abstention doctrine, which bars federal court inter-
vention in pending state court actions, has been invoked to defeat federal
court jurisdiction. 20 7 Taken together, these two doctrines of federal law
have proven to be a fatal dose for litigants seeking to overturn arguably
204. See Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 187 (1988) (refusing to infer a federal cause of
action to resolve dispute over conflicting state custody orders under the Parental Kidnapping
Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A).
205. Section 1916 requires a state court to return custody of an adopted Indian child to the natural
parent or Indian custodian who had custody immediately prior to the adoption, unless there is a
showing that a return would be contrary to the best interest of the child. 25 U.S.C. § 1916 (1994). If
Congress had intended there to be a "best interest" showing under § 1914 before an action of a state
court could be invalidated, Congress could have used similar language.
206. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994); Barbara Ann Atwood, State Court Judgments in Federal
Litigation: Mapping the Contours of Full Faith and Credit, 58 IND. L.J. 59 (1982).
207. See, e.g., Morrow v. Winslow, 94 F.3d 1386, 1397 (10th Cir. 1996) (recognizing that the
abstention doctrine, as established in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), prevented a federal court
from intervening on behalf of an Indian father, when according to a state court judge, consent of the
father was not necessary under Oklahoma law before the child could be adopted).
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erroneous state court decisions in the area of ICWA. With a few limited
exceptions, every Indian parent and tribe which has sought federal court
review of a state court decision in the ICWA arena has either been barred
by the doctrine of collateral estoppel or abstention. The only exceptions
have been cases where litigants sought not to overturn individual state
court decisions, but to prospectively challenge erroneous state adminis-
trative applications of ICWA.208
1. The Tenth Circuit
Ironically, the emasculation of § 1914 also begins with the Baby
Boy L. decision from the Kansas Supreme Court,209 the same decision
which spawned the existing Indian family exception. After that decision
was rendered by the Kansas Supreme Court, the Kiowa Tribe brought an
action in federal court under § 1914 to ask the federal court to declare
the adoption violative of ICWA.210 The district court denied the request
in an unpublished opinion and the United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit affirmed. In Kiowa Tribe v. Lewis, the Tenth Circuit
held that under Kansas law, the issue of the applicability of ICWA was res
judicata because the Tribe and adoptive parents had been parties to the
action in state court. 211 In addition, the court held that the process by
which the Kansas courts decided the issue was not so fundamentally
flawed as to give rise to the argument that due process was not
observed.2 1 2 Lastly, the court, in an apparent circumscribed holding,
held that § 1914 did not create an exception to the general full faith and
credit rule of § 1738 when the Tribe appealed to the state court from a
denial of the Tribe's request to intervene.213
The Lewis court strained to hold out the possibility that an Indian
tribe or other litigant could utilize § 1914 in federal court to challenge a
208. See Native Village of Venetie I.R.A. Council v. Alaska, 944 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1991) (enjoin-
ing a state court practice of denying full faith and credit to adoption decrees from native villages in
Alaska as violative of ICWA full faith and credit provision).
209. 643 P.2d 168 (Kan. 1982).
210. See Kiowa Tribe v. Lewis, 777 F.2d 587,587 (10th Cir. 1985).
211. See id. at 590. It is interesting that the Kiowa Tribe was never allowed to intervene in the
state court proceeding because the Kansas court held that ICWA was inapplicable and therefore the
Tribe had no right to intervention by right. Nevertheless, the federal court held that the Tribe had a
fair opportunity to litigate ICWA claims in the state court and was thus barred from relitigating them in
federal court. Lewis, 777 F.2d at 591.
212. See id. at 591.
213. Id. at 592. The court, in overturning an award of attorney's fees to the adoptive parents
against the Tribe by the district court, noted that another federal district court had ruled for the
Kickapoo Tribe in holding that it could challenge a state court action in federal court, and also
questioned the propriety of the existing Indian family exception. Id. at 594. The other federal district
court decision referred to in Lewis was later reversed. Kickapoo Tribe v. Rader, 822 F.2d 1493 (10th
Cir. 1987).
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state court action before the issue was litigated through the state courts.
The court stated:
the question before us is not whether the federal court is a
'court of competent jurisdiction' entitled to protect an Indian
tribe's interest in foster care placement or terminations of
parental rights in Indian children in a case in which the tribe
sought to assert its rights under ICWA before it sought to
intervene in the state proceeding. The question before us is not
even whether the tribe could have brought suit in federal court
after the state district court denied it the right to intervened....
The question before us is whether the Tribe's taking an appeal
to the state supreme court foreclosed the Tribe from
relitigating later in an independent federal court action. 2 14
This dicta in Lewis, holding open the opportunity that a state trial
court decision in violation of ICWA could be independently relitigated
in federal court before state appellate remedies are exhausted, was seized
upon by the Navajo tribe in another well-publicized decision. The
Navajo Tribe tried to collaterally challenge a state trial court decision
denying Navajo courts exclusive jurisdiction over a member child of the
Tribe domiciled on the reservation before the matter was appealed to the
Utah Supreme Court. 215 A Utah state district court refused to recognize
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Navajo tribal courts to determine a child
custody issue involving a Navajo child domiciled on the Navajo Indian
reservation and held that Utah courts had jurisdiction over an adoption
involving such a child.
After losing the jurisdictional issue at the state trial level, the Navajo
tribe filed an action in federal district court in Utah seeking to pre-empt
the state court's exercise of jurisdiction over the adoption. The federal
district court held that § 1738 barred its reconsideration of the issue. 216
The federal court went on to say it did not sit as an appellate court for
Utah state court decisions and noted that the Navajo tribe had appealed
the jurisdiction issue to the Utah Supreme Court and would be given a
full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue there. 217 With regard to the
fact that the tribal court had entered an order declaring its exclusive
jurisdiction under § 1911(a), and the fact that both the state and federal
courts are mandated to grant full faith and credit to tribal court decisions
in the ICWA arena, the federal court somewhat waffled by declaring that
214. Lewis, 777 F.2d at 592.
215. See Navajo Nation v. District Court for Utah County, 624 F. Supp. 130, 132 (D. Utah 1985),
affirmed, 831 F.2d 929, 929 (10th Cir. 1987).
216. Id. at 135-36.
217. Id. at 135.
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since the Utah court had ruled it had jurisdiction first, the Navajo court
should have honored that determination under full faith and credit and
should not have issued a contrary decision.218
The Tribe appealed the unfavorable federal district court decision,
but in the interim the Utah Supreme Court held for the Tribe in the state
court dispute. 219 The Tenth Circuit held that the state court ruling ren-
dered moot the issues before it, notwithstanding the Tribe's insistence
that a ruling should issue to give guidance to other state courts who were
handling similar voluntary adoption proceedings, oftentimes without the
Tribe's knowledge. 220
What was a tribe to do after Lewis and Halloway? Both cases inti-
mated that the use of state court appellate remedies was the sine qua non
for an application of the federal full faith and credit provision of federal
law. Perhaps the Tribe should have abandoned its appeal in state court, a
fruitful appeal which has even been cited by the United States Supreme
Court, 221 in order to invoke federal court jurisdiction and hopefully gain
a ruling which would have precedential value outside the state of Utah.
At the same time, abandoning the appeal would have been foolish in
light of the ambiguity existing in the law. Further decisions shed light
on these issues and serve to confirm, at least in the Tenth Circuit, that
regardless of how a tribe or advocate seeking an implementation of
ICWA navigates its course, the federal courthouse door will be shut upon
completion of the journey.
The next case to be decided on this issue again came out of the
Tenth Circuit. Kickapoo Tribe v. Rader involved the Kickapoo Tribe's
challenge to the adoptive placement of an Indian child and the refusal of
an Oklahoma state court to allow intervention by the Tribe. 222 After the
denial of its intervention request, the Tribe did not appeal through the
state appellate system, but instead sought federal court intervention
under § 1914. Rader is arresting because the natural father of the
Indian child also sought a federal court order declaring void a state court
termination of his parental rights on the grounds that the notice by
publication in which his parental rights were terminated violated federal
and state due process grounds and the Oklahoma statute on service. 223
The termination occurred before ICWA took effect but the subsequent
218. See id. at 136. As a matter of law, this was clearly erroneous as ICWA does not require a
tribal court to grant full faith and credit to a state court decision, but only vice versa.
219. See In re Adoption of Halloway, 732 P.2d 962, 962 (Utah 1986).
220. Navajo Nation, 831 F.2d at 930.
221. Halloway, 732 P.2d at 53.
222. See Kickapoo Tribe v. Rader, 822 F.2d 1493 (10th Cir. 1987).
223. The federal court took jurisdiction over this claim despite the fact that the United States
Supreme Court had held that a state court order terminating parental rights cannot be collaterally
attacked in a habeas corpus petition. See Lehmer v. Lycoming County Children's Serv. Agency, 458
U.S. 502, 516 (1982).
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placement and adoption occurred after ICWA became law. 224 The
federal district court held that both the father and the Tribe's rights were
violated and set aside the adoption under both due process and ICWA.225
The court of appeals, relying upon Lewis, held that ICWA issues
could not be relitigated in federal court, despite the fact that the Tribe
did not appeal the issues to the Oklahoma Supreme Court in apparent
compliance with the tantalizing dicta in Lewis. Rather, under Oklahoma
law, they were res judicata. 226 In an apparent contradiction, the court
affirmed the lower court's decision that the termination violated the
father's due process rights, despite the fact that the issue was also liti-
gated in state court and the father was most likely collaterally estopped
under Oklahoma law from relitigating it.227 The apparent moral from
Rader is that issues of constitutional law can be relitigated in federal
court, but not issues of statutory compliance with ICWA, despite there
being no doctrinal distinction between the two in the area of full faith
and credit. 228
2. The Ninth Circuit
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit entered
this fray in 1991 by issuing two somewhat incongruous decisions regard-
ing the authority of a federal court to review a state court's determi-
nation of jurisdiction in child custody proceedings involving Indian
children. In Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation v. Superior
Court,229 the court held that it lacked jurisdiction to enjoin a state court
from exercising jurisdiction over a child custody dispute between the
parents of an Indian child and that tribal court jurisdiction was precluded
224. ICWA applies to any proceeding "pending" at the time the law took effect and thus clearly
applied to the placement actions taken by the state court in this case.
225. Rader, 822 F.2d at 1496.
226. Id. at 1501. Once again, just as with the Lewis decision, the state court in Rader had refused
to allow the Tribe to intervene in the state court proceedings to argue for an appropriate placement for
the Indian child under ICWA. Id.
227. The court did not analyze the issue of whether the natural father in Rader was collaterally
estopped from relitigating in federal court the validity of the termination of his parental rights in the
Oklahoma court. It is not clear what jurisdictional statute the father was proceeding under in federal
court. Apparently, the natural father did not participate in the state court proceedings, nor did he seek
to set aside the state court order terminating his parental rights after he discovered that it had been
entered. The Tribe, on the other hand, did seek to intervene in the state court proceedings, although it
was denied that right. The lesson to be learned, perhaps, is to stay out of the state court proceedings
and simply await their outcome in an attempt to avoid the strictures of the full faith and credit clause.
228. If the father was proceeding under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which is likely because he requested
both monetary and equitable relief, it is unclear why the court permitted a collateral challenge on his
claims since the Supreme Court has not drawn any distinction between claims of constitutional
violations versus statutory violations in the application of the federal full faith and credit clause. See
Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
229. 945 F.2d 1138 (9th Cir. 1991).
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under federal law. 230 The case arose from a custody dispute between a
non-Indian father and an Indian mother over a child enrolled as a
member of the Colville Tribe. The father invoked state court jurisdiction
in an attempt to gain custody, while the natural mother invoked tribal
jurisdiction, alleging that the father abused and neglected the child, thus
implicating ICWA.231 The court noted that state court remedies had not
been exhausted by the Colville Tribe and that federal courts are not
available to state court litigants who are dissatisfied with state court
decisions. 232 With regard to ICWA, however, the court affirmed the tribal
court's exclusive jurisdiction over allegations of the father abusing and
neglecting the child.233 This decision, without expressly stating it, seems
to rely upon the doctrine of abstention to rule that the federal courts
should stay their hands even when a clear federal question-whether
Public Law 280, a federal statute designed to confer state criminal and
civil jurisdiction over certain Indian reservations, divests tribal courts of
concurrent jurisdiction-is involved.234
In Native Village of Venetie IRA Council v. Alaska,235 native villages
in Alaska and adoptive parents of native children who adopted their
children through native tribal courts challenged the unwillingness of the
state of Alaska and its officials to recognize adoptions consummated in
tribal courts of native villages. The state claimed that the native villages
were divested of authority to grant adoptions under § 1918 of ICWA and
that the Indian Child Welfare Act retrocession provisions 236 would have
230. See Confederated Tribes v. Superior Court, 945 F.2d 1138, 1141 (9th Cir. 1991); see also 28
U.S.C. §1360(a) (1994). The state of Washington was vested with the discretion to exercise civil
jurisdiction over Indian country in that state, which Washington apparently exercised in the area of
domestic relations. Confederated Tribes, 945 F.2d at 1140.
231. Confederated Tribes, 945 F.2d at 1140.
232. Id. at 1141.
233. Id. at 1140 n.3. The state court judge had apparently agreed with this proposition but
declared that deferring to the tribal court on the abuse and neglect issues did not deprive him of
jurisdiction over the larger custody dispute. Id. at 1139.
234. Public Law 83- 280, 67 Star. 588, codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 25 U.S.C. §§
1321-26, 28 U.S.C. § 1360, was enacted in 1953 to confer civil and criminal jurisdiction to certain
states over Indian reservations in those states. There have been frequent disputes since 1953 over
how much jurisdiction was given states. See Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463
(1979) (finding that the extent to which Public Law 280 vests jurisdiction in state courts and thus
deprives tribal court of jurisdiction is a federal question).
235. 944 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1991).
236. See 25 U.S.C. § 1918 (1994). This section permits a tribe which had been divested of juris-
diction over child custody proceedings involving reservation-domiciled Indian children to petition the
Secretary of Interior for a restoration of its jurisdiction. At first blush, this section seems to imply that
tribal courts were divested of any jurisdiction over reservation domiciled Indian children by the pas-
sage of Public Law 280 or other federal statutes designed to confer jurisdiction upon state courts. Id.
However, most courts that have addressed this issue have held that Public Law 280 merely gave state
courts concurrent jurisdiction over Indian country and that tribal courts retained concurrent juris-
diction. See Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976) (describing the impact of Public Law 280).
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to be complied with before tribal courts could exercise jurisdiction. 237
Initially, the court held that federal court jurisdiction was proper under
28 U.S.C. § 1362238 for the causes of action recited by the native villages
and that federal question jurisdiction for the causes of action alleged by
the adoptive parents arose under the Indian Child Welfare Act full faith
and credit provision. 239 The court then went on to address the question
of whether the full faith and credit provision of ICWA created a federal
cause of action.
In broad language, apparently implicating all the provisions of
ICWA, the Ninth Circuit panel held that nothing in the legislative history
of ICWA indicated a federal intent to bar the federal courts from exercis-
ing jurisdiction to enforce ICWA.240 The Ninth Circuit also held that in
light of the findings of Congress that the state courts had failed in their
obligations to protect the cultural rights of Indian children and tribes,
jurisdiction should be freely exercised. 24 1 In a footnote the court
expressly stated that federal court jurisdiction did lie to correct errone-
ous applications of ICWA by state entities and courts. 242 The court went
on to hold that if the Alaskan native villages possessed the inherent
authorities of Indian tribes, something the court remanded for a determi-
nation of, then the state of Alaska had to recognize the tribal court
adoption decrees under the full faith and credit provision of ICWA
because Public Law 280 had not divested tribal courts of jurisdiction.2 43
Native Village of Venetie is a powerful tool for those tribes and
Indian parents who wish to invoke federal court jurisdiction in the Ninth
Circuit to challenge state actions taken in violation of ICWA. The case
seems to endorse the notion that because not only did Congress fail to
explicitly bar federal court review, Congress also recognized the limita-
tions of a fair state court application of the law based on past history,
thus federal courts should be available to litigants for enforcement of
ICWA. This decision is somewhat tempered by the Ninth Circuit's
237. Native Village of Venetie I.R.A. Council v. Alaska, 944 F.2d 548, 559 (9th Cir. 1991). The
Alaska Supreme Court had held as much in Native Village of Nenana v. Department of Health, 722
P.2d 219, 221-22 (Alaska 1986).
238. See 28 U.S.C. § 1362 (1994). This statute vests federal courts with jurisdiction to litigate a
claim brought by an Indian tribe arising under the laws of the United States. See id.
239. Venetie, 944 F.2d at 552.
240. Id. at 554.
241. The court held that "[i]t would thus be ironic indeed if Congress then permitted only state
courts, never believed by Congress to be the historical defenders of tribal interests, to determine the
scope of tribal authority under the Act." Id. at 553-54.
242. Id. at 554 n.4. The court declared that "a federal court may intervene when a state
expressly refuses to abide by these substantive mandates 'of ICWA."' The court also thoroughly
examined the state of Alaska's argument that Congress did not intend the federal courts to play a role
in enforcing ICWA by strongly endorsing the notion that Congress did intend that the federal courts
oversee state compliance with ICWA. Id. at 553.
243. See 25 U.S.C. § 1911(d) (1994).
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decision one month later in Colville, where the court held that a tribe
should not be able to litigate an issue of jurisdiction in federal court
when the state court provided an appropriate vehicle for litigating the
issue.2 44 Interestingly, both Venetie and Colville involved the issue of the
extent to which federal law divested tribal courts of jurisdiction, although
admittedly the issue in Colville (whether tribal courts had been divested
of jurisdiction in custody disputes between parents) did not directly
implicate ICWA, but the issue in Venetie (the extent to which tribal courts
in Public Law 280 reservations retained jurisdiction over child custody
proceedings) did. The two cases can be harmonized on the ground that
it is not apparent that the Alaskan native villages in Venetie had litigation
pending in state court for the recognition of their adoption decrees.
Instead, these decrees were being ignored by state administrative agen-
cies and therefore an adequate state court remedy did not exist, as it had
in Colville.245
Unfortunately, the Ninth Circuit in Venetie, unlike the Tenth Circuit,
did not address the effect of the full faith and credit provisions of federal
law on the propriety of a federal court overruling an erroneous state
court interpretation of ICWA because the erroneous interpretation in
Venetie was made by state administrative agencies. Section 1738 does
not generally mandate that a federal court grant allegiance to state
administrative interpretations of federal law.246 Hence, it is not clear,
despite the powerful language in Venetie that federal court jurisdiction
would lie and a federal cause of action is stated by a state violation of
ICWA, whether a federal court remedy would await a litigant in the Ninth
Circuit when the litigant attempts to overturn a state court decision. 247
3. Tenth Circuit Revisits Full Faith and Credit and Abstention
The Tenth Circuit continued a somewhat strange and conflicting
odyssey of deciding when a federal court can overrule a state court
244. Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation v. Okanogan County, 945 F.2d 1138, 1141 (9th
Cit. 1991)
245. Some states recognize tribal court orders under the doctrine of comity, but it is not clear
whether Alaska did so at the time the native villages commenced their lawsuit. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 1-1-25 (Michie 1992). Even if Alaska did recognize tribal court orders under comity, it should
be noted that the state of Alaska challenged the premise that native villages were even tribes, further
evidencing that an adequate state court remedy did not exist.
246. See Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 109 (1991).
247. There are two other opinions from the Ninth Circuit that somewhat address the issue. In
Keyes v. Huckleberry House, the court held that a non-member of non-federally recognized tribe
could not litigate ICWA violations in federal court. Keyes v. Huckleberry House, No. 89-51794, 1991
WL 113808 (9th Cir. June 21, 1991). Additionally, in Native Village of Stevens v. Smith, an Indian
tribe challenged the refusal of a state agency in Alaska to pay foster care for children placed by a
tribal court. Native Village of Stevens v. Smith, 770 F.2d 1486 (9th Cir. 1985). The court did not
address issues of standing or of the application of ICWA, except to state that ICWA did not mandate
that a state agency reimburse foster care for children placed by tribal courts. Id. at 1498.
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decision on ICWA in Roman Nose v. New Mexico Dept of Human
Resources.248 Roman Nose involved a pro se action brought by the
natural mother of an Indian child whose parental rights had been termi-
nated by a New Mexico court, a decision that was affirmed on appeal. 249
The mother alleged violations of various laws, including international
treaties, the Constitution, state and federal law, and the Indian Child
Welfare Act. 250 The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to
state a federal claim upon which relief could be granted. The court of
appeals affirmed the dismissal of the constitutional claims, concluding
that the federal courts have no authority to review alleged constitutional
violations of litigants in state child custody proceedings, and also dis-
missed the federal statutory claims. 251 However, the Tenth Circuit
reversed the district court on its conclusion that ICWA violations were
not justifiable in federal court, explicitly holding that under § 1914 of
ICWA federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction to review state court
decisions implementing § 1911, § 1912, and § 1913.252 The court then
distinguished its previous rulings concerning 28 U.S.C. § 1738 by
holding that the rulings stood for the proposition that when a state court
determines that ICWA is inapposite in state court, the decision is not
subject to collateral review in federal court. The court went on to state
that it never held, nor did it take the opportunity to so hold, that § 1738
bars federal court review of a litigant's argument that the state court
misapplied ICWA.253 The court remanded the matter back to the district
court with instructions to give the pro se mother another chance to
amend her complaint to state a specific ICWA violation.
Unfortunately, both for the mother and for legal scholars interested
in the development of this area of the law, the natural mother in Roman
Nose could not retain counsel and eventually her complaint was dis-
missed for failure to properly plead a federal cause of action. 254 This
situation excused the court from explaining why a federal court would
be barred from overruling an erroneous state court decision finding that
the Indian Child Welfare Act did not apply in a particular proceeding,
yet is empowered to review a flawed attempt to apply the law. Such a
doctrine appears to leave the more egregious violation without redress,
whereas the less glaring violations are subject to review. Perhaps the
court was of the opinion that a determination that ICWA did not apply is
not within the parameters of the three sections of ICWA cited in § 1914,
248. 967 F.2d 435 (10th Cir. 1992), affd after remand, 991 F.2d 806 (1993).
249. In re Laurie R., 760 P.2d 1295 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988).
250. Roman Nose v. New Mexico Dep't Hum. Res., 967 F.2d 435, 435-36 (10th Cir. 1992).
251. Id. at 437.
252. Id.; see also 25 U.S.C. § 1914 (1994).
253. Roman Nose, 967 F.2d at 438.
254. See Roman Nose, 967 F.2d at 438.
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and thus is outside the authority of a court of competent jurisdiction to
review. This may be a lesson to potential litigants to not challenge a
conclusion by a state court in the Tenth Circuit that ICWA is inapplica-
ble, but instead to couch one's arguments in terms of lack of notice or a
violation of the procedural standards for an involuntary or voluntary
placement or termination of parental rights. So, for example, in the area
of the existing Indian family exception, the court may not be able to
review whether ICWA applies but would be able to determine whether the
tribe's right to notice or intervention was violated. This is somewhat
paradoxical because before the court could even make a determination
that such rights existed, a finding that ICWA applied to the proceeding
would be mandatory. 255
The window of opportunity cracked by the Roman Nose court has
been apparently slammed shut by the Tenth Circuit in another case
raising issues of federal court authority to question state court decisions
concerning ICWA. In Comanche Indian Tribe of Oklahoma v. Hovis,256
the Tenth Circuit reviewed a decision by the district court enjoining a
state court from continuing to exercise jurisdiction over a termination of
parental rights proceeding in the face of a conflicting claim of exclusive
jurisdiction by a tribal court under § 1911(a). 257 The Tribe had origi-
nally intervened in the state court proceeding and requested a "trans-
fer" of the state court proceedings to the tribal court under § 1911(a).
Later, the Tribe contended that the state court lacked jurisdiction over
the proceedings based on the exclusive jurisdiction provisions in
ICWA.258 The state court denied the Tribe's claim of exclusive
jurisdiction and the Tribe did not pursue an appeal through the state
appellate system, although the mother involved in the proceedings
did.259 Instead, the Tribe sought and obtained a declaration that it had
exclusive jurisdiction over the proceeding under § 1911(a) of ICWA
from the federal district court.
The facts in Hovis seemed to mirror perfectly the apparent excep-
tions to res judicata recognized in Roman Nose: a claim by a Tribe that
255. The Tenth Circuit also seemed to recognize the justiciability of ICWA violations in federal
court in another unpublished opinion. Moore v. Muscogee Nation, No. 96-5099, 1996 WL 472489
(10th Cir. Aug. 21, 1996).
256. 53 F.3d 298 (10th Cir. 1995).
257. It appears that the state court had erroneously transferred jurisdiction to the tribal court over
the mother's oral objection, something not permitted by ICWA. The real dispute over jurisdiction,
however, seemed to hinge on the fact that the natural parents had given a power of attorney over the
child to an Indian aunt who lived on the reservation prior to the state court proceedings being
commenced. The Tenth Circuit apparently believed, however, that under Holyfield, the domicile of
the child was dependent upon the domicile of the parents, who both lived off the reservation.
Comanche Indian Tribe v. Hovis, 53 F.3d 298, 301 (10th Cir. 1995).
258. See id.; see also 25 U.S.C. § 1911 (a) (1994).
259. Hovis, 53 F.3d at 301. The natural mother disputed the tribal court's jurisdiction and thus
only appealed the issues relating to the termination of her parental rights. Id.
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the state court failed to properly apply ICWA to the facts of a proceed-
ing, rather than a claim that ICWA did not apply. Nevertheless, the court
of appeals held that the Tribe was collaterally estopped from relitigating
the issue of its exclusive jurisdiction because the state court had already
ruled against it on the issue. 260 The court cited to previous language in
Lewis in support of its rather strong ruling that § 1914 would never serve
as an avenue of relief in federal court if a party litigates an issue in state
court, irrespective of whether state appeals have been utilized. 2 6 1 The
court held that once a party participates in a state court proceeding
involving ICWA, its only remedy for an alleged violation is state court
appellate remedies and that § 1914 would not serve as a federal court
avenue of relief. 262
After Hovis, it appeared that the only way a party could potentially
utilize the federal courts to attack an unlawful application of ICWA in
the Tenth Circuit would be to stay completely out of the proceeding and
invoke federal court jurisdiction once a state violation is detected. This
approach, fraught with the danger of not participating in the state court
proceedings and thus foregoing arguments, has been rendered a danger-
ous strategy by yet another Tenth Circuit decision applying the doctrine
of abstention to federal courts asked to intervene in ongoing state court
ICWA proceedings. In Morrow v. Winslow 263 an Indian father attempted
to utilize a federal court to enjoin a state court adoption proceeding.2 64
The adoption was going forward without either the father's consent to
termination of his parental rights or an involuntary termination of his
parental rights because of a state court ruling that the father's consent to
260. Id. at 303.
261. Id. at 304. The Hovis court seemed to expand the holding in Lewis by contending that it held
that a party who seeks to litigate a claim in state court is stuck with that decision and may never seek
federal court intervention to overrule a state court decision. Rather, the Hovis court held that "once
the Tribe chose to litigate in State court, review of the State Court's decision was limited to timely
appeal to the state appellate courts and was not 'appealable' in federal district court." Id. Lewis
seemed to turn more on the fact that the Tribe sought and failed in its state appellate remedies because
the court had emphasized the fact that the Tribe had appealed the issue of the applicability of ICWA
through the state appellate system.
262. See id. The unwillingness of federal courts to oversee a wrongful exercise of state court
jurisdiction or wrongful application of ICWA should be contrasted with the apparent willingness of
federal courts to micro-manage a tribal court's exercise of jurisdiction in the area of child custody
proceedings, those governed by ICWA, and those not governed by ICWA. See Dement v. Oglala
Sioux Tribal Court, 874 F.2d 510, 515 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that a federal court has habeas corpus
jurisdiction under Indian Civil Rights Act to determine whether a tribal court exceeded its jurisdiction
over a non-Indian father in awarding custody of Indian children contrary to a state court decision);
Brown v. Rice, 760 F. Supp. 1459, 1463 (D. Kan. 1991) (holding that a federal court has jurisdiction to
enjoin a tribe from exercising jurisdiction over child custody proceeding in violation of its own law).
But see Sandman v. Dakota, 816 F. Supp. 448, 452 (W.D. Mich. 1992), aff'd, 7 F.3d 234 (6th Cir. 1993)
(holding that a federal court lacks jurisdiction under Indian Civil rights act and ICWA to oversee tribal
court disposition of dependency and neglect action).
263. 94 F.3d 1386 (10th Cir. 1996).
264. Morrow v. Winslow, 94 F.3d 1386, 1389 (10th Cir. 1996).
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the adoption was not necessary under Oklahoma law. 265  The facts in
this case appear to suggest a clear violation of the provisions of ICWA
requiring a state court to find evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that
serious emotional or physical injury would befall a child before termi-
nating a parent's parental rights, as well as testimony by a qualified
expert witness to support such a finding.266
The holding in Morrow is fascinating because it exemplifies the
laissez faire attitude of the Tenth Circuit toward violations of ICWA.
When the case was first initiated in federal district court, there had not
been a determination by the state trial court that the father's consent to
the adoption was not necessary.2 67 The federal district court therefore
dismissed the federal action for failure to state a claim. However, while
the federal court appeal was pending, the state trial court determined that
the adoption could go forward without the father's consent and without
termination of his rights. 268 The court even proceeded to grant the
adoption petition, although there was a technical problem with the entry
of the decree itself.269 Despite the fact that the father appeared to have
no remedies in state court, beyond appellate remedies, and that all the
parties to the case requested the federal court to rule on the issues at
hand, the Tenth Circuit sua sponte, apparently in order to settle the
matter and not disturb the future placement of the child, invoked the
265. Id. It appears that the state judge held that the father had abandoned the child and thus his
consent to adoption was not necessary. The natural mother was non-Indian and had consented to the
adoption. Id. at 1388. It is unclear, based on a review of the federal court's decision, whether the
state court, in holding that the natural father's consent to the adoption was not necessary, was holding
that he was not a parent under ICWA or that ICWA did not apply because of the existing Indian
family exception which had been adopted by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in In re S.C. The latter
appears unlikely because Oklahoma had repealed the exception, thereby repealing the decisions
allowing state law to control on the issue of abandonment. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 40.5 (West
Supp. 1997). The decision of the state court, assuming that it is not based upon a finding that the Indian
father was not a parent under the Act, appears to be in blatant violation of the state and federal
ICWA. See In re Adoption of Baade, 462 N.W.2d 485 (S.D. 1990).
266. See 25 U.S.C. § 1912 (1994). Many states allow adoption proceedings to go forward with-
out the consent of a natural parent who had abandoned his child under certain circumstances. Such
state laws appear to be superseded by the requirement of ICWA that no parent's parental rights may
be terminated without a finding by the state court, supported by qualified expert witness testimony,
beyond a reasonable doubt that the placement of an Indian child with the non-custodial parent would
result in severe emotional or physical harm to the child. See § 1912(e). Oklahoma decisions prior to
the amendment of the Oklahoma ICWA, clarifying that the existing Indian family exception to ICWA
was no longer viable in Oklahoma, recognized that state law would control on the question of whether
the consent of a non-custodial parent who had abandoned his child was necessary, and that ICWA
need not be complied with. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 40.5; In re Adoption of D.M.J., 741 P.2d
1386, 1389 (Okla. 1985) (holding that the fact that an Indian father had not paid support for over one
year precluded the lack of his consent from barring the state court from ordering adoption by
non-Indian step-parent on theory that ICWA did not apply); In re Adoption of Baby Boy D., 742 P.2d
1059, 1064 (Okla. 1985) (stating that termination of an Indian father's parental rights prior to the birth
of an Indian child is permitted under the existing Indian family exception).
267. Morrow, 94 F.3d at 1388.
268. Id. at 1389-90.
269. Id.
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doctrine of abstention and dismissed the father's federal complaint
without prejudice. 270 The court held that § 1914, although it gave the
federal court jurisdiction over ICWA violations, was not an exception to
the general rule that federal courts should not intervene in ongoing state
court proceedings and that the father would have to utilize the remedies
available to him in state court.
Dismissing Morrow's complaint without prejudice may indicate that
the court recognized the right of Morrow to bring his action anew
should he not gain relief through the state appellate court system. This
would be a false reading, however, because it is now apparent that, at least
in the Tenth Circuit, there appears to be no way to challenge a state
court's erroneous application of ICWA if the nature of the violation is
the subject of a pending state court action.
4. Synthesizing the Ninth and Tenth Circuit Perspectives
Morrow should be contrasted with the Ninth Circuit decision in
Native Village of Venetie which recognized a federal cause of action to
enjoin state officials from continuing to violate the full faith and credit
provision of the Indian Child Welfare Act. 271 There, the violation was
not the subject of an ongoing state court proceeding, but instead was
bureaucratic intransigence to follow federal law. 272 It is not clear, in
light of the Colville decision from the Ninth Circuit, (wherein the court
refused to enjoin a state court action premised upon a faulty interpre-
tation of federal law with regard to whether Public Law 280 preempted
tribal court jurisdiction over child custody proceedings) whether Venetie
270. Id. at 1398. The significance of a dismissal without prejudice, as opposed to one with preju-
dice, is wanting because it is apparent that after the father exhausts his appellate remedies in the state
system he will not be able to return to the federal court to gain a reassessment of whether his rights
were violated under ICWA because of 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994).
271. 944 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1991). It is improbable that the Venetie court would have applied the
doctrine of abstention, even if a valid state remedy existed for the native villages to challenge the
refusal of state officials to recognize their adoption decrees, because of the Court's rather forceful
conclusion that Congress obviously intended some federal court remedy to invalidate illegitimate state
court ICWA decisions.
272. There was also a state court action brought in an Idaho district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
challenging the failure of the state of Idaho to adopt appropriate administrative regulations to
implement ICWA. See Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Harris, No. 94-316, Second Judicial District, County of
Nez Perce (Idaho). The case was settled before going to trial.
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could be invoked to challenge a state court's apparent violation of the
Indian Child Welfare Act.273
There are various potential bureaucratic violations of ICWA which
could be litigated under various theories in federal court.274 However,
such theories are no consolation to Indian parents and tribes who wish to
challenge the more pernicious violations of ICWA committed primarily
by state courts. These include the invocation of the existing Indian
family exception to deny tribal input into state court decisions regarding
Indian children 275 and the use of the best interest of the child standard to
273. The only other court to address the availability of a federal remedy to challenge a state
court's decision in ICWA arena is the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in In re
Larch, 872 F.2d 66 (4th Cir. 1989). There the court was faced with a custody dispute between the
natural parents of Indian children and conflicting state and tribal court custody orders regarding them.
Id. at 67. The court first held that the federal district court had jurisdiction over the Tribe's request
that its court order be honored under 28 U.S.C. § 1362, which permits an Indian tribe to sue in federal
court to enforce rights created under federal law. Id. The court then held that the Tribe was a state
under the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A, (PKPA) and that the Tribe did not
state a claim under the PKPA upon which federal relief could be granted. Id. at 68. The court
seemed to imply that had the Tribe made out a claim under ICWA, federal court jurisdiction would
have existed. Id. at 69.
274. As this article contends, 25 U.S.C. § 1914 is not the exclusive route by which a party can
challenge state activity or inactivity taken in violation of ICWA. Indian tribes have a statutory right to
invoke federal court jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1362, which states that "[tihe district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of all civil actions, brought by any Indian tribe or band with a governing body
duly recognized by the Secretary of the Interior, wherein the matter in controversy arises under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1362 (1994). The United States
Supreme Court has held that this statute authorizes suits by tribes in federal court even when a private
entity would be barred from bringing a similar action. See Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai
Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976) (holding that a tribe's access to federal court not be defeated by Tax
Injunction Act because of 28 U.S.C. § 1362). Although this statute does not waive the Eleventh
Amendment immunity of states from suits by tribes, the Eleventh Amendment would apparently not be
implicated in a suit brought to rescind an unlawful action of a state in violation of federal law because
of the Exparte Young doctrine. See Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775 (1991); Ex
parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). But see Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Harris, No. 94-316, Second Judicial
District, County of Nez Perce (Idaho). The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has
held that Indian tribes may bring suit under § 1362 to contest state action taken contrary to ICWA. See
Native Village of Venetie I.R.A. Council v. Alaska, 944 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1991). Tribes have also
been recognized as persons who can sue to enjoin state actions taken in violation of federal law under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Fond du Lac Band of Chippewa Indians v. Carlson, 68 F.3d 253 (8th Cir. 1995)
(holding that a tribe's suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 not barred by sovereign immunity); United States v.
Washington, 813 F.2d 1020, 1024 (9th Cir. 1987) (denying a tribe's application for attorney fees under
42 U.S.C. § 1988). But see Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996) (barring tribe's
suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act to enforce compact
negotiation provisions of Indian Gaming Regulatory Act barred by state's Eleventh Amendment
immunity). Similarly, individual Indian parents would apparently have standing to bring suit under §
1983 to enjoin state officials from violating ICWA, although one court has held that that does not
extend to suits for monetary relief. See Fletcher v. Florida, 858 F. Supp. 169, 173 (M.D. Fla. 1994)
(dismissing mother's suit for money damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of ICWA on the
grounds that ICWA only provides for equitable relief). Finally, the federal question statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331, has been recognized by at least one court as an alternative jurisdictional statute to challenge a
violation of ICWA. See Venetie, 944 F.2d at 548.
275. One of the troublesome issues that arises when a state court refuses to apply ICWA because
of the existing Indian family exception is that Indian tribes are denied the right to intervene in these
proceedings. Because most state laws require that such proceedings be kept confidential, barring
intervention also means that these tribes may be forever barred from finding out the eventual
placement of an Indian child. The bond between child and tribe is thus potentially severed.
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deny the exercise of tribal court jurisdiction, another form of denying
appropriate tribal input. Both are instances where the state court itself is
apparently doing violence to the clear language of the Act. They are
also instances where appropriate tribal input into the fate of Indian
children is being unnecessarily frustrated.
Unless the federal courts pump some much needed vitality into §
1914 of ICWA, the process of certain state courts deconstructing ICWA
will continue. The next section offers an alternative interpretation of §
1914 which more closely resembles the intent of Congress.
IV. 25 U.S.C. § 1914 AS AN EXCEPTION TO THE APPLICATION
OF 28 U.S.C. § 1738 RATHER THAN A GRANT OF
JURISDICTION TO THE FEDERAL COURTS
How can a party dissatisfied with an apparently erroneous state
court application of the Indian Child Welfare utilize a federal forum to
gain relief without suffering the pitfalls of the federal full faith and
credit provision? 276 Congress must have intended there to be some
"court of competent jurisdiction" to provide redress for violations of
certain provisions of the Act pertaining to state court decision-making.
State courts and tribal courts, as this article has demonstrated, were
apparently not the intended beneficiaries of this boon of authority. If
the federal courts are the designated courts of competent jurisdiction, yet
ICWA does not clearly except itself from the rigors of the full faith and
credit statute, § 1914 makes no sense because it merely grants juris-
diction to the federal courts to place their imprimatur on a state court
decision-the ultimate rubber stamp.
Nor can it be legitimately argued that § 1914 was intended to
correct the activities of state or private non-judicial entities that violate
the rights of Indian parents or tribes outside the context of an ongoing
state court proceeding. The sections of ICWA which are justiciable
under § 1914 all pertain to mandates imposed upon state courts and not
state social service agencies. 277 Section 1911, containing the jurisdic-
tional provisions of ICWA, clearly delimits the exercise of state court
jurisdiction, while § 1912 and § 1913, which impose certain require-
ments upon state courts before they may place a child in foster care,
terminate parental rights, or permit a voluntary placement of an Indian
276. Removing an ICWA case from state to federal court does not appear to be a viable option
because removal is not available unless the action could have been brought originally in federal court.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1994). Any action brought under § 1914 could not be brought until such time
as the state court or entity erroneously applies ICWA, which may be too late to invoke federal court
jurisdiction because of 28 U.S.C. § 1738.
277. It is interesting to note that § 1914 is not available to challenge a placement decision made
by a state entity or court under § 1915. There is no indication in the legislative history why § 1914 is
applicable to the procedural provisions of ICWA only and not the substantive provisions.
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child, unquestionably pertain to the procedures that state courts must
utilize in dealing with Indian child custody proceedings.278 It seems
unlikely that Congress intended to vest federal courts with jurisdiction to
overturn erroneous state court applications of the Indian Child Welfare
Act, while at the same time neglecting to except ICWA from the general
requirement that federal courts must grant full faith and credit to state
court decisions. The federal courts must restore some teeth to § 1914 or
congressional intent will clearly be frustrated.
One obvious interpretation of § 1914 which restores its vitality is
that it is not an express grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts to
overturn violations of ICWA, but rather is actually an explicit exception
to the full faith and credit doctrine, similar in many respects to the
habeas corpus exception. 279 This exception recognizes that when there
is an overriding federal interest involved, and Congress understood that
there would be circumstances where "the federal courts would step in
where the state courts were unable or unwilling to protect federal
rights," 280 federal courts need not grant preclusive effect to state court
determinations in federal court. This interpretation of § 1914 is the only
way to salvage it from the scourge of meaningless to which it has been
rendered by the federal courts that have interpreted it. The remainder of
this article will demonstrate why such an exception is in order and how it
more fully comports with Congressional intent.
It is beyond peradventure that the Indian Child Welfare Act serves
an important federal objective, one that when left to the devices of state
courts had been frustrated. This is an important point to understand, as a
tool of construing both the sum of ICWA's parts and its individual
components. 281 The mistreatment of Indian families and tribes was wide-
spread in both federal and state institutions and created the dire circum-
stances that existed prior to the passage of ICWA. An examination of
why this problem was a federal priority is in order to understand why
federal court involvement is necessary to fully implement the Act.
The federal legacy of the treatment of Indian children is a sad and
sordid one and laid the groundwork for the situation in 1978 that caused
Congress to pass ICWA.282 The beginning of the destruction of Indian
278. This dichotomy between procedural and substantive requirements of ICWA was noted by
the United States Supreme Court in Holyfield. Mississippi Band Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S.
30, 36 (1989) (noting that the most important substantive requirements of ICWA are the placement
preferences in § 1915).
279. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1994).
280. Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 314 (1983) (quoting Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 95 n.7.
(1980)).
281. See Native Village of Venetie I.R.A. Council v. Alaska, 944 F.2d 548, 553 (9th Cir. 1991).
282. See Patrice H. Kunesh, Transcending Frontiers: Indian Child Welfare in the United States,
16 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 17, 20-22 (1996); see also R. PRAIr, BATTLEFIELD AND CLASSROOM: FOUR
DECADES wrrH THE AMERICAN INDIAN 1867-1904 (1964).
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families lies in the assimilation period of the late 1800s and early 1900s
when the federal government was attempting to assimilate Indian families
into the non-Indian mainstream. 283 On the economic level, this attempt
was made through the process of allotment, whereby the reservation land
base was broken up into parcels of land which were then allotted to indi-
vidual Indians and Indian families on the premise that the Indians would
become farmers and adapt to the agrarian lifestyle of their non-Indian
neighbors.2 84 To facilitate this process, land that remained after the adult
Indians on a particular reservation received their allotments was given to
non-Indian homesteaders who would, the theory went, serve as teachers
for the less sophisticated Indian farmers and ranchers. 285
Thus, the hope was to assimilate Indians into the American econo-
my. On the other spectrum, moral assimilation was being attempted by
the government in the belief that the only way future generations of
Indians would survive would be to throw off the chains of "barbarism"
and adopt the Christian values of their non-Indian conquerors. 2 86
However, many policy makers believed that this moral assimilation
would be unsuccessful on adult Indians, who were considered beyond
hope, so the focus fell upon Indian children. The result was a belief that
Indian children necessarily needed to be away from the "savage"
influences of their parents and placed in places where Christian dogma
and morals could be inculcated in them. 2 87
This transmogrification would occur, it was hoped, in boarding
schools, usually operated, but not always, by various denominations of
283. See COHEN, supra note 21, at 139-42.
284. Id. at 130-139. The allotment process, instead of increasing the value of Indian land, has
actually devalued it because the land that was allotted has been so fractionalized that it is of little
economic value to Indians themselves and thus is oftentimes merely leased out to non-Indians.
285. This process of surplus allotment and the allotment process itself led to the checkerboarding
of reservations and compelled the United States Supreme Court to restrict tribal jurisdiction in many
cases over their own reservations. See County of Yakima v. Confederated Bands of Yakima Indian
Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 262 (1992). The court stated that tribes have no authority to tax portions of the
reservation which had been opened up for homesteading to non-Indians. Id. At 265.
286. One of the proponents of allotment was Senator Henry Dawes for which the Dawes
Allotment Act was named. Many people believe that Dawes saw allotment in pure economic terms as
a way of integrating the Indian into the agrarian economy. A closer look at his writings reveals,
however, that Dawes was a moral elitist who believed that Indian people led a savage lifestyle that
could only be stripped of them if they were denied the right to practice their culture and traditions. For
example he wrote in the Atlantic Monthly about his moral viewpoint of Indian people: "It was plain
that if he (American Indian) were left alone, he must of necessity become a tramp and beggar with all
the evil passions of a savage, a homeless and lawless poacher upon civilization and a terror to the
peaceful citizen." H. L. Dawes, Have We Failed with the Indian, 84 ATLANTIC MONTHLY NEW YORK
280 (1899).
287. This is perhaps evidenced best by a statement by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs who
stated: "It is admitted by most people that the adult savage is not susceptible to the influence of civili-
zation, and we must therefore turn to his children, that they might be taught how to abandon the path-
way of barbarism and walk with a sure step along the pleasant highway of Christian civilization ....
They must be withdrawn, in their tender years, entirely from the camp and taught to eat, to sleep, to
dress, to play, to work and to think after the manner of the white man." See H.R. EXEC. Doc. No.
50-1, at XIX (1888).
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Christian sects. 288 Federal statutes were enacted which forced Indian
families to allow their children to go to boarding schools or face losing
their rations. 289
At many of these boarding schools, a process of cultural degrada-
tion began. Indian children were oftentimes denied the right to speak
their native languages, practice their traditional spiritual beliefs,: groom
and wear native attire, and were frequently denied the right to visit their
native families for long periods of time. 290 All of these denials were
countenanced upon the belief that Indian children needed to be "Chris-
tianized" in order to survive in contemporary society. 29 1 There were
also reported instances of Indian children being physically and sexually
abused in many of these schools to the point where several Christian
denominations have recently issued apologies for their behavior during
this period of time.292
The federal government played a role in this attempt at social
engineering both by mandating that Indian children attend such board-
ing schools and by operating BIA boarding schools. An often over-
looked provision of the Indian Child Welfare Act is § 1961 where
Congress notes that the absence of conveniently located day schools for
Indian students was contributing to the unwarranted break-up of Indian
families. 293
Although Congress emphasized that state courts and institutions
were the primary vehicles for the unwarranted removal of Indian chil-
dren from their homes and tribes, it is clear that the federal government,
with its policy of forced cultural assimilation, laid the ugly foundation
288. For example, the Latter Day Saint's Church removed thousands of Indian children from
their families annually on the premise that these children were being raised in cursed homes,
exemplified by the dark skin of their families, and placed them in Mormon homes. See Kunesh, supra
note 282, at 23 n.31 (quoting REX W EYLER, BLOOD OF THE LAND: THE GOVERNMENT AND CORPORATE
WAR AGAINST THE FIRST NATIONS 149 (1982)).
289. See Act of July 13, 1892, ch. 164, 27 Stat. 120, 143 (formerly codified at 25 U.S.C. § 284
superseded by 25 U.S.C. § 282 (1994)).
290. As anthropologist Peter Farb described the boarding school experience:
"The children were usually kept at boarding school for eight years during which time
they were not permitted to see their parents, relatives or friends. Anything Indian-
dress, language, religious practices, even outlook on life . . . was uncompromisingly
prohibited. Ostensibly educated, articulate in the English language, wearing store-bought
clothes and with their hair cut short and their emotionalism toned down the boarding
school graduates were sent out either to make their way in a white world that did not
want them or to return to a reservation to which they were now foreign."
PETER FARB, MAN'S RISE To CIVILIZATION 257-59 (1968).
291. As the founder of one of the first boarding schools, Richard Pratt, stated in 1892: "Kill the
Indian in him and save the man." A Bid to Redefine Indian Education, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1995.
292. See CLYDE ELLIS, INDIAN EDUCATION AT THE RAINY MOuNTAIN B OARDING SCHOOL: 1893-1920
(1995); Ken Kolker & Ed Golder, Stories Shock Nuns' Superiors; Sex Abuse Alleged at School for
Indian Youth, TIMES-PICAYUNE, July 17, 1994, at A2.
293. See 25 U.S.C. § 1961 (1994). This problem is somewhat addressed by 25 U.S.C. § 2001e
(1994), which stresses the need for the BIA to provide more local schools for Indian education.
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for the statistics Congress cited when it enacted ICWA. Not only did the
federal government contribute to the problem, but it also has an obliga-
tion to correct the problem under its trust responsibility to Indian tribes
and people. That responsibility resembles the obligation a guardian has
toward a ward, and was described by Justice Marshall as "a nation
claiming and receiving the protection of one more powerful, not that of
individuals abandoning their national character and submitting as
subjects to the laws of a master." 294 The trust responsibility is the
product of treaties between many Indian tribes and the United States
government and the pronouncement in the United States Constitution
that the federal government has the exclusive authority to regulate
commerce with Indian tribes. 295
The federal government had a role in creating the problem that led
to the enactment of ICWA and now has a role, borne of its federal trust
responsibility, to attempt a resolution. The federal interest in protecting
Indian children and Indian tribes from the vagaries of state courts and
procedures is thus apparent. Congress heeded its trust and enacted
ICWA in an attempt to rectify previous policies and vindicate the rights
of Indian tribes and children against the abusive practices of state courts.
The question remains as to whether Congress vested the federal courts
with an concomitant obligation to protect tribal interests against state
encroachment.
The United States Supreme Court rejected the argument that an over-
riding federal interest in protecting the civil rights of persons against the
abuses of state officials justifies an exception to the federal full faith and
credit statute in Allen v. McCurry.296 Allen involved 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
the jurisdictional statute that permits a party to sue a person acting under
color of state law for a violation of a constitutional or statutory right
preserved under federal law. The Allen court rejected the notion that §
1983, because it is designed to protect persons against state violations of
federal civil and constitutional rights, is an exception to full faith and
credit statute, § 1738.297 In so doing the court noted that the "federal
courts should be able to step in where the state courts were unable or
unwilling to protect federal rights." 298 This exception, however, seems
limited to instances where state procedural rules or state court action
294. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 555 (1832).
295. The Indian Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3, authorizes the federal govern-
ment to legislate to protect the rights of Indian tribes in the face of competing state interests. Interest-
ingly enough, the United States Supreme Court recently declared neither this clause of the constitution,
nor the interstate commerce clause, authorized Congress to waive the immunity of states from suits
brought by Indian tribes. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1119 (1996).
296. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 104 (1980).
297. Id. at 101.
298. Id. at 95, n.7; see also Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 314 (1983).
[VOL. 73:395
INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT
prohibits a particular party from asserting a federal claim, and does not
permit a federal court to exercise jurisdiction under § 1983 over a
federal claim merely because the state court got the issue wrong or
historically was not vigilant in assuring the protection of rights.299
The Supreme Court noted in Allen and its progeny, 300 that the
question of whether Congress intended a federal jurisdictional statute to
except itself from the general rule of § 1738 is a matter of congressional
intent-as it is clear that Congress can permit the litigation of a federal
claim in federal court notwithstanding a resolution of the issue in state
court.30 1 The federal habeas corpus statute 3 02 is such an example of
Congress effectuating the Fourteenth Amendment through an exception
to the full faith and credit clause. Other federal statutes, however, do not
contain evidence of a clear intent to exempt them from the requirements
of § 1738. 30 3
As a statute merely granting federal courts jurisdiction over ICWA
violations, § 1914 does not appear to fit the bill for an exception to the
full faith and credit clause, as it makes no mention whatsoever of § 1738.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held as much
when it decreed that it does not believe Congress intended to make an
exception to the full faith and credit requirement when it enacted
ICWA.304 The analysis laid out in such decisions is wanting, however,
when considering the congressional intent behind § 1914. The Tenth
Circuit construes the section as a granting of jurisdiction to the federal
courts. Viewed in this light, there appears to be no concomitant grant of
authority to ignore state court decisions. Whether Congress intended to
exempt ICWA from the requirements of § 1738 all revolves around the
meaning of § 1914 and whether Congress intended it to be a jurisdic-
tional grant or a statute authorizing federal court de novo review of state
court ICWA decisions.
As this article has demonstrated, the sections of the Indian Child
Welfare Act that are subject to collateral attack in a court of competent
299. The court rejected the notion that because a federal cause of action was created in response
to perceived inadequacies in state court protection of civil rights, such statutory intent justifies finding
an exception to the full faith and credit requirement. Allen, 449 U.S. at 98-99.
300. See Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. Ed. 465 U.S. 75, 84-5 (1984) (stating that even with
regard to federal claims not litigated in state court action but voluntarily dismissed, federal courts must
apply the same rules of preclusion that state courts would apply in pending § 1983 and § 1985 action).
301. Id.
302. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1994); see also Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 417-20 (1963) (recognizing the
authority of federal courts to review state constitutional determinations in habeas corpus proceedings
in order to effectuate the Fourteenth Amendment).
303. See, e.g., Migra, 465 U.S. at 75 (stating that neither § 1983 nor § 1985 are exceptions);
Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1983) (stating that Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act is not an exception to the full faith and credit requirement).
304. See Comanche Indian Tribe v. Hovis, 53 F.3d 298, 303-04 (10th Cir. 1995); see also Kiowa
Tribe v. Lewis, 777 F.2d 587, 591 n.4 (10th Cir. 1985).
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jurisdiction all involve activity that takes place inside the courtroom,
whereas the provisions Congress did not subject to the section involve
placement decisions usually made by state or private agencies or parties.
The only reasonable interpretation of this distinction is that Congress
intended to allow litigants to attack procedural violations by state courts
under § 1914, whereas violations of the substantive placement provisions
of the Act, contained at § 1915, which are generally made by other than
non-judicial entities, are not exempt from the full faith and credit
requirement. 305
By drawing this distinction, unless Congress believed that the pro-
cedural safeguards of the Act were more important than the substantive
requirements, a point of view obviously not shared by the United States
Supreme Court,306 Congress must have felt that without a particular
provision in ICWA allowing collateral challenges to procedural irregu-
larities of state court proceedings, such challenges would not be possible.
In addition, other provisions of the Act could be enforced in differing
manners, such as through the other jurisdictional provisions of federal
law. Therefore, Congress must have intended § 1914 to represent an
exception to full faith and credit rather than a creation of federal court
jurisdiction. Were it solely and exclusively a grant of federal court juris-
diction, it is illogical for Congress to create federal court jurisdiction to
challenge state court procedural violations which, ipso jure, could never
be the subject of a federal court challenge because by their nature they
are res judicata in federal courts.
A few examples show the validity of this assertion. Section 1914
allows a court of competent jurisdiction to overturn an erroneous appli-
cation of § 1911, the jurisdictional provisions of ICWA. The action
subject to challenge would be a court's exercise of jurisdiction, an action
inherently imbued with judicial action, not extra-judicial action. There-
fore, if a state court took jurisdiction over an adoption proceeding
involving Indian children domiciled on a reservation contrary to §
1911(a), the argument that § 1914 is a grant of jurisdictional authority
to a federal court to challenge that determination is a non sequitur
because by its very nature the resolution of a federal jurisdictional
question by a state court cannot be collaterally challenged. In addition,
Congress acted on the presumption that federal courts already possessed
jurisdiction to declare null and void a state court's exercise of excess
305. This is not to say that a court does not make placement decisions regarding the foster care
or adoptive placement of a child. Generally, however, social service and private agencies place
children and if challenged in court, defend those decisions.
306. The Supreme Court in Holyfield seemed to stress that the procedural and substantive pro-
visions of ICWA are equally important in implementing the goals of Congress. See Mississippi Band
Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 36 (1989).
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jurisdiction, thus did not need to be vested with it. However, § 1914, if
intended to be an exception to § 1738, would clearly dictate, just as with
a federal writ of habeas corpus, that the federal court review the federal
question de novo without granting deference to a state court's legal
determinations.
The language utilized by Congress in § 1914 further bolsters the
contention that Congress intended § 1914 to allow federal courts to
overrule erroneous state court decisions free of the yoke of the full faith
and credit statute. Section 1914, unlike federal civil rights statutes which
speak to affirmative injunctive or monetary relief, only permits federal
courts to "invalidate" state court action which is taken in violation of
federal law. As the legislative history states, this section allows a federal
court to set aside a foster care placement or a termination of parental
rights, 307 but does not provide any other type of affirmative relief. One
court has held that this section restricts claims for monetary relief and
only permits federal courts to render null and void state court actions. 308
The use of the term "invalidate" strongly suggests that Congress felt it
was bestowing upon the federal courts the license to grant remedial relief
from a state court decision, rather than the authority to provide some
affirmative relief to a litigant whose rights may have been violated under
ICWA.309
This suggestion comes into focus when one examines the body of
federal court decisions prior to ICWA that discuss the jurisdiction of the
federal courts to grant relief to Indian tribes and award damages against
state entities. Congress clearly enacted ICWA understanding that there
were already jurisdictional mechanisms in place for an Indian tribe,
parent of an Indian child, or Indian child to utilize the federal court to
seek relief from an invalid action of a state actor.310
This interpretation of § 1914 brings it in line with the federal
habeas corpus statute, which allows federal courts to invalidate state court
307. See H.R. REP. No. 95-1386 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7546.
308. See Fletcher v. Florida, 858 F. Supp. 169, 171 (M.D. Fla. 1994).
309. Indeed, the latter interpretation may very well be unconstitutional in light of Seminole Tribe
v. Florida, as it is now clear that the Indian Commerce Clause does not permit suits against states or
state officials seeking affirmative relief in federal court. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114
(1996). ICWA was enacted pursuant to the same Indian Commerce Clause that the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act was enacted under. This constitutional impediment is not present, however, in an
action seeking to invalidate a state court decision. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1994).
310. See 28 U.S.C. § 1362 (1994) (authorizing federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over actions
brought by Indian tribes alleging violations of federal or constitutional law by states or state actors);
Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976). This case was decided during
debates on the passage of ICWA. The Supreme Court held that § 1362 authorizes Indian tribes to sue
states in federal court for a refund of taxes illegally collected notwithstanding the Tax-Injunction Act.
Examples of pre-existing jurisdictional statutes that the federal courts had recognized, prior to the
enactment of ICWA, could be utilized by both tribes and Indian persons are: 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994)
and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1331 (1994). Congress did not need to affirmatively vest federal courts with
jurisdiction by § 1914 therefore to permit federal courts to review state denials of tribal rights.
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convictions taken in violation of federal constitutional guarantees. It
does not render state courts or officials liable either in their official or
personal capacities for violation of the Indian Child Welfare Act, but
merely permits federal courts to invalidate an action taken in violation of
the federal mandate. It would, at the very minimum, eliminate disparate
rulings between states in the same federal circuit and would hopefully
facilitate the development of a uniform application of ICWA decisions,
which the United States Supreme Court sees as vital.311
Nor should such an interpretation of § 1914 be construed as an
attack upon the integrity of the state judicial process. It should be
recalled that ICWA itself is an acknowledgment that the state courts were
deficient in rendering judgments in child custody proceedings involving
Indian families, an area imbued with judicial discretion. This deficiency
is not the product of overt racism or animus toward Indian people, but
instead is the result of cultural ignorance and a lack of historical retro-
spect regarding the plight of Indian families and tribes. Enactment of a
federal statute that has no federal enforcement mechanism is not going
to magically eliminate the problems that Indian tribes and families
encounter in state court forums. Nor does it assure that state court
judges, by merely reading the law, will gain a necessary perspective of
tribal values to enable them to pass appropriate value judgments on
Indian families and the cultural needs of Indian children. As the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recognized in Venetie, it
would be strangely ironic if Congress had adopted a federal remedial
statute imposing strict requirements upon state courts and left the
enforcement of that statute solely up to the perceived violators.3 12
V. CONCLUSION
The Indian Child Welfare Act represents a golden opportunity for
Indian tribes and families to address the problem of cultural dissonance,
caused by federal and state efforts to destroy Indian cultures, in a
culturally neutral arena without external value judgments eroding the
process. It permits Indian tribes to resolve their social and familial
problems internally and to bring back into the fold so many of their
children torn away because of past efforts of assimilation. This process
311. See Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 54 (noting that federal statutes should be uniform in application).
312. The court, in response to an argument that the Indian Child Welfare Act's full faith and
credit provisions could not be enforced in federal court, but rather was only a binding mandate upon
state courts, held that "[i]t would thus be ironic indeed if Congress then permitted only state courts,
never believed by Congress to be the historical defenders of tribal interests, to determine the scope of
tribal authority under the Act." Native Village of Venetie I.R.A. Council v. Alaska, 944 F.2d 548, 553
(9th Cir. 1991).
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will be a long and arduous one, but it has an effective underpinning
because of the enactment of ICWA.
The Indian Child Welfare Act gives Indian tribes and families some
breathing space while they go about the process of cultural rebirth. This
space is invaded when state courts attempt to undermine ICWA by
fanciful decision-making designed to carve out exceptions to the Act
and limit its application. In instances where state courts tinker with
clearly pronounced federal objectives, the federal courts must exercise
the authority given them by Congress to intercede and protect Indian
tribes and families against the vagaries of state courts. If this does not
occur, the process of cultural degradation will continued unabated and
the vision ICWA represents will be forever dimmed.

